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Passing messages to soldiers on the battle field, conducting online banking, and down-
loading files on the internet are very different applications that all share one thing in com-
mon, concerns over security of the data being processed. Data security depends on the
cryptographic systems that take into account both the algorithmic weakness and the weak-
nesses of the hardware devices they are implemented on. The current dominant hardware
design medium is complementary metal-oxide-semi-conductor (CMOS). CMOS has been
shown to leak more power as the technology node size decreases. The leaked power has a
strong correlation with the bits being manipulated inside a device. These power leakages
have brought on a class of power analysis that is able to extract secret information being
processed in the algorithm with far less computational power than brute force guessing. Re-
cently, many hardware designs have been proposed which have shown resistance against
different forms of power analysis by changing hardware layouts; however, these designs
are realized in the same technology, CMOS, that causes the side channel attack problem.
There are many emerging technologies that are becoming more practical to implement
in conjunction with CMOS. Of these, neuromemristive systems have two characteristics
that can be exploited to prevent side channel attacks: low power operation and stochastic
behavior. Attacks were conducted on both CMOS and neuromemrisitve based mitigations
of the SHA-3 algorithm. In this thesis, digital side channel attack mitigations are created to
exploit dual-rail logic. A secure neuromemristive primitive is designed using neural logic
blocks that, to the best of our knowledge, have not been considered by others in mitigation
of power analysis. Also, an in-depth analysis of power attacks on linear functions com-
pared to typical non-linear attack points is conducted. Metrics such as number of power
traces used for the Correlation Power Analysis (CPA), correlation coefficients, confidence
ratios, power consumption, and transistor count were used to compare circuit performance.
Success rate of guessing a key during SHA-3 operations, while configured as a MAC, was
used as a system benchmark. It was found that CMOS is effective in countermeasures
when masking linear functions, with the ability to use current standard cells, in ASIC de-
sign. If reconfigurable circuits are considered, the neuromemristive circuit had the overall
best mitigation strength with almost complete decoupling of input data to power dissipated;
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Messages received from soldiers in the field could call in artillery strikes, call for emer-
gency medical evacuations, and signal an area safe for others. Cryptographers have done
research in ensuring cryptographic algorithms are computationally safe; yet, information
leaked from physical implementations is used to compromise security without dealing with
the mathematical strength or weakness of an algorithm, leading to destruction on the battle
field.
These leakages have brought on a class of analysis that extracts secret information with
far less computational power than brute force guessing. This has the implication of break-
ing any current, or future, cryptography algorithms if weaknesses in hardware implemen-
tations are not addressed. The problem has been known for decades with no full-proof
solution. The first corrective measures involved writing software to mask what operations
were currently being performed in the cryptographic algorithm. This masking, through use
of the same hardware, but different software implementations, has been shown effective at
preventing a simple set of the power analysis attacks. This masking at the software level
shows almost no resilience to more modern and elegant power analysis strategies. Recently,
many hardware designs have been proposed that show resistance against different forms of
power analysis by using different hardware layouts. These designs drastically reduce the
effectiveness of power analysis by changing the power profile of the hardware implemen-
tation; generally, by the use of dual-rail logic, to increases the number of power traces to
mount a successful attack. Decreasing attack feasibility makes a cryptographic algorithm
more resistant to side channel attacks; however, as devices become more efficient and the
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level of computations increase, the same problem will show itself again because the so-
lutions are all based on a platform, CMOS, that is causing the issue. Dual-rail logic also
comes at the cost of higher area and power overheads.
Memristors are a basic electrical two terminal component where internal resistance is
based on the history of the previous current that has flowed through it. Memristors are
simple devices made out of thin film allowing high scalability to lower technology nodes.
Their ‘memory’, or state, component makes them good candidates in neuromorphic de-
signs that generally require some sort of memory component. Neuromorphic designs are
those that attempt to recreate, or are inspired by, the biological processes in our brains to
perform computations that are very expensive on traditional computing platforms. These
have been broken down into neurons, the element that receives inputs and creates outputs,
and synapses, the elements in connecting neurons together. The memristor works as the
synapse by holding a value representing a weight for a single connection. This weight
describes how connected the two neurons are too each other. To determine these weights,
training is done on the circuit until it gives desirable results using some sort of cost reduc-
tion algorithm.
Neural Logic Blocks (NLBs) use these memrisitive devices in a network that is analo-
gous to reconfigurable blocks in a Field Programmable Gate Array (FPGA). The network
is able to be configured in such a way to allow different logic functions to be trained based
on selection of synaptic weights. These blocks could be implemented in an FPGA instead
of current configurable logic blocks (CLBs) to allow the properties of low power consump-
tion with stochastic operation for secure implementations of any cryptographic algorithm.
Another benefit comes with the compact design of the NLBs, as they use less transistors
than current look-up table (LUT) based FPGAs.
The document is broken down as the following: Chapter 2 will focus on background
information required to understand the work done, Chapter 3 will cover the supporting
work used, Chapter 4 will discus the designed circuits, Chapter 5 will show the design flow
used for power analysis, Chapter 6 will document all results from the work, and Chapter 7




This section will cover a description of SCA, cryptogrphic hash functions, applications of
hash functions, a specific hash function called SHA-3 and the basic concepts of neuromor-
phic design that will be used for mitigations.
2.1 Side Channel Attacks (SCA)
SCAs are a category of attacks, in the cryptographic domain, that take measurable data
from hardware implementations of algorithms and draw correlation to the algorithm’s in-
put. This data can be time [20], power [10], radiation [11] or any phenomenon that is
measurable. Fig. 2.1 shows the flow of mounting a SCA. Private data is given to a crypto-
graphic algorithm that provides some level of security by using mathematical operations.
The attacker collects leakage data using sensors, oscilloscopes, timers, etc. The attacker
then uses various techniques to try and figure out what secret data was processed. These
techniques will be discussed later as they apply to power analysis. SCAs come at the risk
of making secure algorithms insecure with, in some cases, minimal energy and time. SCA
on cryptographic algorithms will be studied as applied to cryptographic hash functions.
2.2 Cryptographic Hash Functions
Cryptographic hash functions are a stricter subset of standard hash functions that are similar
to fast data processing functions. A hash function takes a message of any length as an
input and then outputs a set number of bits as seen in Fig. 2.2. Where cryptographic hash



























Figure 2.2: Standard hash function operation
output. These properties are [17]:
• Pre-image resistance: given H(Mi), find Mi
• Second pre-image resistance: given M1 find M2 such that H(M1) = H(M2)
• Collision resistance: find M1 and M2 such that H(M1) = H(M2)
These three properties should be hard to break for an algorithm to be considered a
secure cryptographic hash function. Hard to break is defined by how many combinations
of the output bits, n, need to be tested before one of the conditions above is found. Pre-
image and second pre-image resistance should be 2n while collision resistance is 2n/2.
With n chosen to be of large enough, brute force searches become unfeasible on current
computing platforms. Cryptographic hash functions are used in many applications such as:
unique message signatures, authenticated encryption, password databases, etc.
2.3 Message Authentication Codes (MACs)
Secure hash functions have many uses when two parties wish to know data has not been
tampered with. This is commonly seen on the internet when a file download has a checksum
listed next to it. The checksum is obtained by running the entire file through a hash function
and generating a message digest. When the user downloads the file, they run the file through
the same hash function and compare their obtained digest with the listed checksum. If the
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hash function is truly hard to invert, by following the previously defined properties, the user
should be confident the file has not been tampered with.
Another use case for secure hashing is in password databases. If a database stored
usernames linked to passwords, an attacker would only need to steal the database to have
access to all of the user accounts. To mitigate this, secure databases will only store the hash
of a password linked to the usernames. When a user enters his correct password, software
will hash the entered password and compare it to the value in the database. If the hacker
obtains the data in the database, they will only have hashes of the correct password. As
long as the pre-image condition described holds, the attacker would have to brute force
search 2n messages to find a message that hashes to the same value for access to a user
account. This also means that there exists multiple passwords that can be used to log into
a user account, but the property of second pre-image resistance requires finding this to be
hard, i.e. 2n.
The use case that will be explored in this work will be hash functions used for MAC
implementations. MACs are used to determine if the message sent from one party came
from that party. Referring to Fig. 2.3, assume the scenario where Bob wants to send Alice
a message, where Bob will be a real user and Alice represents a web server. The first
step involves Bob and Alice both agreeing on a secret key to use by way of public key
cryptography. Public key cryptography is beyond the scope of this work so it will be
assumed that the keys have been properly established and only Bob and Alice know them.
When Bob wants to send a request to Alice, Bob will first send his message through a
hash function to generate a digest/tag. Bob will then send both the message and the tag
to Alice. Upon receipt, Alice will take Bob’s message and put it through the same hash
function to generate a digest/tag. Alice will then compare the generated tag to Bob’s sent
tag. If the tags match Alice can assume that the message came from Bob [17]. In this
case, no encryption is being done. The key is being used as the secret information that will
provide a unique signature that could only be performed by messages originating from Bob
or Alice. This can be further applied to authenticated encryption where SHA-3, the Keccak






Figure 2.3: Standard Message Authentication Code (MAC) Operation
2.4 Merkle-Damgard Vs. Sponge Hash Construction
Hash functions are typically built on algorithms that have a set input and a set output.
Since a hash function is desired to have input of variable size, a step is required to ensure
the input message can be fully processed by the algorithm. There are two dominant theories
for construction: Merkle-Damgard and sponge. Merkle-Damgard uses an idea of chaining
inputs shown in Fig. 2.4. The message is broken into N blocks based on a multiple of the
defined hash function input and then padded so all inputs to the hash functions are full. For
the first message block, the block is sent to a hash function with some initialization vector.
The output is sent to the next hash function that also takes the next message block. The
multiple inputs to the hash function are XOR’d together to provide a single input to the
hash function. This continues until every message block has been processed in the hash
function. The final hash function output will be the digest.
This works well for solving the variable input problem, but structural weakness in this
construction have been found which reduces the strength of the pre-image, second pre-
image, and collision resistant properties. These weakness are:
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Figure 2.4: Merkle-Damgard Hash Construction
• Length Extension Attack
• Multi-collision attacks
• Herding attacks
Length extension attacks show up when any Merkle-Damgard based MAC construction
uses H(secretKey||p(message)). The attacker only needs to generate
H(secretKey||p(message)||p(controlledMessage)) (2.1)
The attacker never learns the secret key, and does not have access to the original message.
The hash digest gives the attacker the last state of the hash function that can be used to
generate a new message. The attacker can then compute a new digest from the previous
state with his appended message. This will result in a message and digest that will look to
be valid from another user/server.
Multi-collision and herding attacks follow a similar strategy. The attacker tries to find
a collision on one of the hash outputs. Once this collision is known, the attacker can build
an infinite number of messages that all hash to the same value. This is dangerous if one
thinks about how messages are sent over the internet with standard header information. An
attacker just needs to find a collision at the end of the header and can then generate any
type of message. There would be no way for the other party to distinguish that the original
message has been tampered with. [17]
Sponge construction involves the concepts of absorbing and of squeezing to solve the
9
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Figure 2.5: Sponge Construction as can be seen in SHA-3
structural problems found in Merkle-Damgard construction [5]. Fig. 2.5 shows the structure
of a sponge function when applied to the Keccak hash permutation. The message is split
into chunks similar to the Merkle-Damgard construction. These chunks are absorbed in the
same manner by XORing the previous state and the current message block and running it
through the hash permutation, f . The difference is the portion of the state, c, that is internal
to the algorithm as is not the case in the Merkle-Damgard approach. It is impossible to
know the final state of the hash construction as only a portion of the state, r, is used as
output. Sponge construction also brings the benefit of variable output as the construction
can continuously be squeezed to generate more output bits. These properties solve the
weaknesses of the Merkle-Damgard construction mentioned above.
This work investigates mitigations of SCA with power analysis on the target implemen-
tation of SHA-3. SHA-3 is a new standard hash function, making it a good target to explore
mitigations on before weaknesses are exploited.
2.5 SHA-3
The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) is a government funded agency
that has the responsibility of establishing and keeping standards in many application do-
mains, which include cryptography. Of their standardized algorithms, they have released a
family of hash functions called secure hash algorithm (SHA). In 2007, NIST held a compe-
tition looking for the next SHA algorithm, SHA-3. This came as SHA-0 had been broken
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and SHA-1 had theoretical breaks. SHA-2 had no known theoretical breaks, but had a sim-
ilar construction to SHA-1. This fueled a desire for a new SHA algorithm. SHA-3 was to
be diversified from the previous algorithms so no theoretical attacks developed for SHA-2
could be easily modified for SHA-3. Keccak was chosen as the winner of the SHA-3 com-
petition on Oct 27, 2012. In 2014 NIST published a draft federal information processing
standards (FIPS) publication outlining the standard implementation for SHA-3.
Fig. 2.5 shows the construction of Keccak. Keccak uses a sponge construction where
every hash operation is denoted by an f in the figure. Keccak is then defined by specifying
the values of r and c. r refers to the rate of the algorithm and is the speed that messages can
be consumed and digests generated. c refers to the internal capacity and is never propagated
as an output, but controls the level of security of the algorithm. The authors of Keccak
prove that the strength of Keccak is equal to 2c/2 [7]. One Keccak hash permutations is
broken into 12 + 2` rounds where ` is found from 2.2 and w is the size of a word in the
implementation.
w = 2` (2.2)
For simplicity in comparison, the suggested Keccak implementation in FIPS 202 [15]
will be used which has r = 1024, c = 576, and w = 64. This means that the Keccak
permutation will have 24 rounds for any block of input that needs to be absorbed1. The
SCA mitigations discussed in this work are for securing the Keccak permutation to provide
security to SHA-3 and any other algorithm that uses the Keccak permutation as a base.
Keccak focuses on manipulation of an internal state at the bit level. The Keccak authors
use a set of terminology when talking about the Keccak permutation that can be seen in
Fig. 2.6. A Keccak state is 5x5xw bits, or 5x5x64 in this case. The state is filled starting
from (0, 0, 0) along the z-axis until full, then along the x-axis, and finally the y-axis. Once
r bits have been filled, the remaining state is initialized to ‘0’ to represent c. Similar to
chaining algorithms, there must be a padding function that makes sure the input data is a
multiple of r. The padding function used in SHA-3 is a 10*1 structure where the bits ‘1’,
1Keccak will be referred to as SHA-3 throughout this work when the full algorithm is being addressed. Keccak will













Figure 2.7: The filled SHA-3 state for one input vector in MAC configuration
1 to r-1 ‘0’s, and a final ‘1’ bit are appended to the message to ensure it is a multiple of r.
Fig. 2.7 shows how the state will be filled for experiments in this work. The bottom plane
will contain a 320-bit key, followed by two more planes (640-bit) and one lane (64-bit) of
random input. The key will be, in hex format: {00,01,02,03,...,39}.
The Keccak permutation then can be describe in 6 distinct operations: State XOR,
theta(θ), rho(ρ), pi(π), chi(χ), and iota(ι).
2.5.1 State XOR
The State XOR involves filling a Keccak state and then performing the bit-wise XOR op-
eration between the current state and the previous state. In the case of the first state, the
previous state is a Keccak state with all ‘0’ bit entries. This provides the absorption prop-
erty of the sponge construction. Power analysis at this state is not a primary target as the
initial state and the input are known. This would be a good attack point if a random initial-




θ provides column diffusion by calculating each column’s parity and using an XOR func-
tion to combine two neighbor columns. This is defined by:
S[x][y][z] = s[x][y][z]⊕ (⊕4i=0(s[x− 1][i][z])⊕ (⊕4i=0(s[x+ 1][i][z − 1]) (2.3)
To reduce hardware complexity of having an 11-bit XOR operation for every output bit,
θ is typically implemented in two phases: the θ plane creation and the θout phases. The θ
plane creation follows:
θplane(x, z) = ⊕4y=0(s[x][y][z])
x ∈ {0, 1, ..., 4}, z ∈ {0, 1, ..., 63}
(2.4)
The θ plane is created with 5-bit XOR operations. The θout phase can be implemented
with 3-bit XOR operations as follows:
θout(x, y, z) = s[x][y][z]⊕ θplane(s[x− 1][i][z])
⊕ θplane(s[x+ 1][i][z − 1])
x, y ∈ {0, 1, ..., 4}, z ∈ {0, 1, ..., 63}
(2.5)
Fig. 2.8 show a visual representation of the state operation. The output at a single bit in
the state is the current bit and the 10 bits of two neighboring columns. In hardware, this is
typically done in two stages. 320 5-bit XORs convert the columns into a 5x64 plane. 1600
3-bit XORs take an initial bit and 2-bits from the θ plane to create the output of θ. This is
a good SCA attack point as there is a mixing of known and unknown bits in the creation of
the θ plane and θout.
2.5.3 Rho (ρ)
ρ provides inter-slice diffusion inside the state. This is done by rotating the lanes by an




Figure 2.8: θ permutation of Keccak state.
Figure 2.9: ρ permutation of Keccak state [7]
operation is:





t ( 10 ) = (
x
y ) 0 ≤ t < 24
−1 x = y = 0
(2.6)
Fig. 2.9 shows a visual representation of the ρ permutation. Table 2.1 shows the offsets
that are used for each of the lane rotations that follow 2.6. The permutation in hardware
can be done by remapping using wires, not provide useful power data for a SCA.
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Table 2.1: ρ offsets
x=3 x=4 x=0 x=1 x=2
y=2 153 231 3 10 171
y=1 55 276 36 300 6
y=0 28 91 0 1 190
y=4 120 78 210 66 253
y=3 21 136 105 45 15
2.5.4 Pi (π)
π provides long term diffusion by permuting the lanes to different locations in the state. π
is mathematically defined as a multiplication of the current state by a matrix in GF(5) as
follows:
S[x][y] = s[x][y] ∗ ( 0 12 3 )
ᵀ (2.7)
The entire lane, values along z-axis, moves to the new (x, y) coordinate. Also, the
permutation defines the center state as (x, y) = (0, 0), where as during state filling, the
bottom left bit has (x = y = 0). Fig. 2.10 shows a visual representation of π. The
permutation is broken down into 6 subfigures where the movement happens about the center
(0, 0) point. Since π is just a remapping of bits, this is a bad SCA target for the same reason
as mentioned for ρ.
2.5.5 Chi (χ)
χ provides the only non-linear function of Keccak, important so Keccak is not vulnerable
to linear cryptographic analysis. χ can be thought of as 5-bit, 5w parallel S-boxes operating
on the rows of the Keccak state. It is mathematically defined as:
S[x, y] = s[x, y]⊕ (NOT (s[x+ 1]), y)s[x+ 2, y]) (2.8)
Fig. 2.11 shows a visual representation of the χ permutation involving one XOR, one
AND, and one NOT gate per state bit. This non-linear operation was chosen by the authors
for its low gate count. This is a great candidate as a target for SCAs as each 5-bit row can
15
Figure 2.10: π permutation of Keccak state [7]
Figure 2.11: χ permutation of Keccak state
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Table 2.2: ι round constants
RC[ 0] 0x0000000000000001 RC[12] 0x000000008000808B
RC[ 1] 0x0000000000008082 RC[13] 0x800000000000008B
RC[ 2] 0x800000000000808A RC[14] 0x8000000000008089
RC[ 3] 0x8000000080008000 RC[15] 0x8000000000008003
RC[ 4] 0x000000000000808B RC[16] 0x8000000000008002
RC[ 5] 0x0000000080000001 RC[17] 0x8000000000000080
RC[ 6] 0x8000000080008081 RC[18] 0x000000000000800A
RC[ 7] 0x8000000000008009 RC[19] 0x800000008000000A
RC[ 8] 0x000000000000008A RC[20] 0x8000000080008081
RC[ 9] 0x0000000000000088 RC[21] 0x8000000000008080
RC[10] 0x0000000080008009 RC[22] 0x0000000080000001
RC[11] 0x000000008000000A RC[23] 0x8000000080008008
be thought of as a 5-bit S-Box, the typical attack point in AES. [27] shows when keys get
larger than one plane, χ is a required attack point for finding the full key. Also, they show
using a larger key gives the best security, with keys that are multiples of r being the most
effective. In this work, χ will not be looked at as a SCA analysis point as it is not needed
for keys that reside only in the first Keccak plane. If mitigations work for keys residing in
a single plane, they are inherently valid for the more complicated cases.
2.5.6 Iota (ι)
ι is the last permutation of the Keccak hash function. A constant value is XOR’d with the
first lane (0, 0). This constant value is different for every round making each Keccak round
different. The round constant comes from a 64-bit linear feedback shift register (LFSR).
This mitigates the chance of the Keccak state entering a cycle. A cycle, in the context of a
cryptographic algorithm, is when a previous round output is generated by a future round.
The consequence is that the rounds in the middle have no impact on the algorithm, greatly
reducing security. χ and θ ensure the value from ι is mixed into the state the following
round. Table 2.2 shows the round constants for the 24 rounds of Keccak. ι has 64 unknown
values and 64 known values. This could be used as a SCA analysis point, but only for the
first 64-bits of the key. If the key is longer then 64-bits, which is recommended, another








Figure 2.12: A simple neron model
For SCA mitigations, many groups have looked at using different digital CMOS strate-
gies to mitigate attacks with no clear umbrella solution. The neuromorphic computing
paradigm implements logic much different than traditional AND, OR, etc gates by using
inspiration and abstractions from the human brain. Analog circuits, that are more suscepti-
ble to noise, could provide enough randomness to help decorrelate leakage data in a circuit
to the input being processed.
2.6 Neuromorphic Computing
Neuromorphic computing is a field that has groups who wish to mimic how the brain oper-
ates or build systems that take inspiration from abstractions of the brain. Our current Von
Neumann computing architectures are very efficient and reliable when it comes to typical
number crunching; however, the hard to solve problems, that make up the computer vi-
sion and machine intelligence domains, are not made easier from number crunching. Even
though a computer can compute many Fourier transforms a second, a task that we could
never hope to achieve, it can be near impossible for a computer to distinguish a cat from a
dog [18].
This work does not attempt to implement neuromorphic computing components in
hopes of making a system that can solve problems similar to the brain. It will attempt
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to implement neuromorphic computing components to take advantage of some of their in-
herent properties. The brain with its approximate 20 billion neurons has single neurons
connected to 10,000 other neurons. These connections are called synapses, and it is be-
lieved that the connections, or lack of connections, is the result of learning and forgetting.
Signals propagate through the brain when these neurons are stimulated from the amount
of input they receive. The important properties from the brain for this implementation are
its low power, approximately 20 W for the entire brain, and its stochastic nature of oper-
ations, thanks to the synaptic connections. Fig. 2.12 shows the model that will be used,
a single neuron with 5 synaptic connections. An activation function, described in section
3.3, will determine when the neuron should be active. Equation 2.9 describes this neuron
model where X is the input, W is the corresponding weight and Y is the output after ap-
plying some activation function. Synaptic weights will be used to mimic the concept of
plasticity in the brain where connections to the neuron can be strengthened or weakened
depending on what a desired output should be2. This can be implemented in memory units
in digital design, but is not easily scalable if network size becomes too large. Memristor







Memristor devices link charge and magnetic flux [28]. They are thin film, two-terminal,
passive circuit devices that are known for their pinched hysteresis loop shown in Fig. 2.13.






2For more detailed information, [16] goes more in-depth about computational neuromorphic computing as only a few
basic properties are desired in this implementation.
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Figure 2.13: I-V characteristice of the piecewise linear memristor model [24]
The output strength is configured by adjusting the property M allowing for the concept
of a synaptic weight to be realized with one device. This device allows for highly scalable
architectures due to the simple two-terminal nature of the memristor. For digital design,
this would require a memory unit for every synaptic weight bit of precision. The calculation
of the synaptic weight and input is done by the differing amount of current that can flow
through the memristor based on its configured resistance. The summation step, in the
analog domain, is done by a shared memristor node. This leads to a massive resource
savings as flip-flops to store weights, multipliers to calculate synapse responses, and adders




3.1 SCA with Power Analysis
SCA can consist of analyzing power consumption [10], electromagnetic radiation [11],
timing information [20], cache hits/misses, etc. For this work, only power analysis will be
explored as it relates to simple power analysis (SPA), differential power analysis (DPA), and
correlation power analysis (CPA). Power analysis is made possible because of the transistor
properties in CMOS design. When a transistor transitions to a logic ‘0’ or to a logic ‘1’,
it consumes power. The power has been shown to be consistent over multiple similar
operations by an experiment done by Paul Kocher [10]. Fig. 3.1 shows the distribution
between of power consumed for an AES S-box operation. The least significant bit (LSB)
of the S-box output, an 8-bit value, was targeted. The power consumed for 16,000 traces
was separated into two bins based on if the LSB was ‘1’ or if it was ‘0’. The figure shows
that the mean distribution when the LSB was ‘1’ is different than that of when it was ‘0’.
Power analysis tries to find patterns between this characteristic power consumption and the
input being processed of a specific cryptographic algorithm.
3.1.1 Simple Power Analysis (SPA)
SPA attempts to decipher what is going on inside a hardware implementation based on
how much power is consumed in a circuit from a single waveform. Fig 3.2 shows a power
trace from an implementation of Rivest-Shamir-Adleman (RSA), one of the first public key
encryption algorithms. In [10], it is shown that by looking for the peaks at each clock edge,
the RSA key can be obtained by noting that a large peak corresponds to a ‘1’ and a small
peak corresponds to a ‘0’. The peaks have to do with different mathematical operations
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Figure 3.1: Distribution of power over 16000 traces in an AES hardware implementation [10]. The
distribution on the left is when the LSB was ‘0’ while the distribution in the right with the the LSB
was ‘1’.
in RSA that are dependent on the current bit (‘1’ has more operations than ‘0’). This is a
dangerous problem as a secret key can be found by human inspection in a matter of seconds
with no required knowledge of the input or output to the system.
SPA can show features in a power trace to indicate when certain operations are hap-
pening inside a cryptographic system and how long they are taking. Once features can be
determined in power traces, an attacker can use these features to help extract key informa-
tion; however, SPA is generally not used to attack current cryptographic implementations
as it is very easy to counter. A small amount of noise in the system may be enough to mask
the signal to where it is not easily deciphered from inspection. Also, this noise can make
attack automation hard when trying to determine if a certain feature is present or not. With
a single trace, it is hard to reduce noise, which is where DPA comes in.
Fig. 3.3 shows a single SHA-3 power trace. From this power trace, it is possible to see
the cycles that are used to load the data, the cycles are used for the permutation rounds,
and the cycles are used to generate output. This can facilitate reducing the search space of
a waveform for an attack; yet, the data of interest to determine the secret key resides in the
variations of the waveform peaks. It can require thousands of traces and statistical analysis
to find correlations that map algorithm input to power consumption that is not possible
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Figure 3.2: Power trace from an implementation of RSA where the secret key can be deduced from
a single trace. Red represents the parts of the waveform that leak the bit is ‘1’, green represents the
parts that leak the bit is ‘0’ [10]
Time3ksample3dv








Figure 3.3: Power trace for one SHA-3 permutation including the input buffering, SHA-3 permuta-
tion and output generation
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from a single trace.
3.1.2 Differential Power Analysis (DPA)
DPA was developed in [10] to provide a more robust way to find secret keys that is resistant











Fig 3.4 shows a visual model for the attack strategy using 3.1. Many input messagesM ,
broken into individual messages Mi, are created and given to a cryptographic implementa-
tion. Power traces P , broken into individual power traces Pi, for each input vector are then
collected. The secret key is broken up in sections depending specifically on what makes
sense for the algorithm under attack; generally, it is the size of the nonlinear permutation to
make calculations easier. For this example, assume the key, K, is 128-bit and is broken into
8-bit guesses, Kj . Each key section has 256 key guesses that range from 0 to 255. For each
key guess, the attack will attempt to find the output Iij , where Iij = S(Mi, Kj) and S(. . .)
is a selection function that determines if a bit under attack is a ‘1’ or ‘0’. Once the attacker
has this, they can target one bit of Iij and divide all power traces into two bins based on if
the target bit is a ‘1’ or a ‘0’. From Fig 3.1, if the current guess is right, it should correctly
split the power traces into groups that represent the power consumption in the circuit. If it is
an incorrect guess, it should split the power traces randomly. Once the attacker has a bin for
output ‘0’ and ‘1’, they average the bins and then take the difference of them. Because of
the previous found result that the power consumption differs depending on the value of the
bits, the correct differential trace should be the one that has the largest peak. Differential
traces from wrong guesses should approach zeros with enough traces in the attack. This is
because the sample mean of a random distribution, over enough samples, should converge
to the distribution mean; thus making the difference of two different random samples of












Figure 3.4: Differntial power analysis attack model
Figure 3.5: Differntial power analysis on AES key showing guess 1,2,3,4,5, where guess 3 is the
correct key byte [10]
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SHA-3 Linear Function - Key Guess 0x05 SHA-3 Linear Function - Key Guess 0x85
AES non-linear S-box permutation
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1
0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0
1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1
0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1
AES non-linear S-box permutation
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1
0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1
0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0
1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0
0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0
1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1
0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1
0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0
1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0
0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0
1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0
1 0 0 1 1 1 1 0
1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1
1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1
0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0
0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0
Figure 3.6: An example of a non-linear’s and linear function’s impact on output bits for key guesses
of 0x05 and 0x85. The top examples are for SHA-3 (linear) while the bottom examples are for AES
(non-linear). Light red indicates the portion of the operation that is controlled by the attacker for
generating outputs to the selection function (key guess). The dark red numbers represent the bits
that can affect the dark red block, the target bit in DPA.
DPA is insensitive to noise because of differential traces. The more traces used, the
more likely any random noise will be removed during the differential subtraction step.
This attack works well when it is used on non-linear portions of a cryptographic algorithm
because small changes in the input of the non-linear portions should have a large effect on
the output. For algorithms where the best attack points are linear, problems with the DPA
method can be seen.
An example showing a comparison of DPA between linear and non-linear functions can
be seen in Fig. 3.6. This shows the linear SHA-3 operation of the θ plane creation versus
the non-linear S-box function of AES, which has an XORing of a round key before the
function. Both operations use an XOR function of some known data and some secret key
data. A key of 0x05 and 0x85 are shown together to see the different effects on the output
with the change of a single bit. On the linear SHA-3 permutation, changing a bit in a key
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guess can only impact the same bit in the output. In the AES case, changing any bit in the
input to the non-linear function can have an impact on any output bit. This is important as
DPA targets certain bits of the output. If only the LSB is considered, the impact of the the
plain text bits from the MSB to LSB+1 are thrown away when figuring out the bin to put
the waveform in for the SHA-3 case. This throws out the differing power of the transistors
in the circuit that do not directly effect the target bit, most bits in the design. As such, the
non-linear function can be seen as a function that is providing some amount of information
about all bits that enter it, while linear functions need some other methodology to get this
information.
3.1.3 Correlation Power Analysis (CPA)
CPA was first described in [8]. It is based off the Pearson correlation coefficient that de-
termines the relationship between how two random variables change. CPA works because
it has been shown that there is a strong correlation between the transistors that have transi-
tioned and power consumed than just the current state of the transistors (as in DPA). When
the number of transistors set is used, this is called hamming weight. When the number
of transistors that have changed value is used, this is called hamming distance. Hamming
weight and hamming distance are referred to as power models of CMOS circuits, and allow
for characterization of a circuit to be reduced to correlation between its power consumed
and one of these models. CPA tries to find the correlation between power consumed and
either the hamming weight or hamming distance of the input and output of the algorithm.
The lower the magnitude of the correlation coefficient, the less likely a key guess is the
correct key.
The Pearson correlation coefficient is shown in 3.2. The Pearson correlation coefficient
is the covariance of the data, power traces and hamming distances/weights, divided by the





For linear functions, CPA solves the problem of DPA involving a lack of correlation
between bits in a section of attack. CPA takes into account the state of all bits for each
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attack block as the hamming weight or hamming distance is the metric that is compared to
power data, instead of the state of an individual bit.
Since this work will focus primarily on mitigations to current implementations of CMOS
designs in the cryptographic context, it is important to discuss the leading proposed solu-
tions. The majority of proposed mitigations use the same CMOS digital design principles
to reduce power leakages that are at the root cause of the problem. A neuromorphic design
in the analog design domain will be proposed as a possible competing solution.
3.2 Current Mitigating Designs
3.2.1 Dual-rail with Precharge Logic
Dual rail with pre-charge logic is a family of mitigation designs that split transistor opera-
tion into a pre-charge and evaluation phase with the additional use of complementary logic.
The pre-charge phase is meant to set the circuit to a known electrical state before any bit
transitions happen, eliminating the use of the hamming distance power model. The com-
plementary logic is meant to mask the power of the number of bits set in the cryptographic
algorithm, eliminating the use of the hamming weight power model. The evaluation phase
is the normal phase where a bit becomes a logic ‘1’ or logic ‘0’.
Wave Dynamic Differential Logic (WDDL) attempts to hide power consumption by
replicating the inverse of the circuit so that every bit transition from ‘1’ to ‘0’, there also
exists a ‘0’ to ‘1’. Fig. 3.7 shows an example of a WDDL AND gate. This was tested on
an FPGA [9] and found effective against DPA. The authors suspected that more sensitive
measurement equipment might be able to mount a successful SCA. Shortly after, a new
attack that focuses on a condition called the Early Evaluation (EE) effect was developed
that exploits a condition where two inputs to a logic gate arrive at different times [26].
Assume the case where the values of A and B are set to ‘1’ in Fig. 3.7. Initially, all inputs
to the two gates are ‘0’, pre-charge, setting the output of both gates to logic ‘0’. During the
evaluation phase, if A and B arrive at some 4t time different from each other and Ā and
B̄ arrive at the same time, the OR gate would transition to its correct state of logic ‘0’ 4t









Figure 3.7: Wave Dynamic Differential Logic implementation of an AND gate. Not shown is the
pre-charge circuitry that ensures A, B, Ā and B̄ are initialy logic ‘0’ before the evaluation phase.
a simple problem to solve as it would require exact capacitance matching in VLSI layout.
Masked Dual-rail Pre-charge Logic (MDPL) attempts to avoid the need for perfect bal-
ancing of wires inside the design by masking every value and pre-charging cells [19]. This
comes at the cost of increased power consumption and area overhead as much as a factor
of 4. The design was shown to run slower than WDDL; yet, it does not have the notice-
able attack vulnerabilities of WDDL and does not require capacitance balanced wires. This
makes for an easier implementation, but at the cost of higher power consumption and much
larger area.
Secure Triple Track Logic (STTL) solves the problem of EE by adding a synchroniza-
tion signal to the pre-charge/evaluation signal to prevent evaluations until all signals are
valid [23]. It requires a synchronization signal that is slower than the dual-rail logic delay
providing a design that runs slower for cases that would not normally need synchronization.
The benefit is that this logic style can be considered completely dual-rail.
Balanced Cell-based Differential Logic (BCDL) is the final design that will be discussed
in this family of mitigations that improves on STTL by using a fast global synchronizing
signal [14]. This design is still slower than MDL and WDDL but faster than STTL.
There are also many variations on the WDDL implementation that will not be discussed
here. They can be seen to improve on the basic WDDL flaws, but not at a level that would
justify hardware development costs for implementations.
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3.2.2 Software level
[2] introduces a way to mask power consumption by using random code not correlated to
the cryptographic operation being performed. Code is analyzed to determine blocks that
contain cryptographic calculations and then random code is inserted into these blocks. This
was shown to be effective against DPA but at the cost of 30% longer run times and 27%
higher power consumption. Also, these designs run on processors that lose the benefit of
fast gate-level algorithm designs.
All the presented mitigation designs make minor modifications to the current design
paradigm of digital CMOS logic with varied success. It stands to reason that stepping out
of the digital CMOS design context, that has the inherent properties allowing information
leakage, may help to find circuits that have strengths against power analysis.
3.3 Neural Logic Block (NLB)
The architecture that will be explored in this work is the NLB. Specifically, the NLB of
focus is the Multi-threshold NLB (MTNLB) proposed in [24]. An NLB is a component
that uses the computational neuromorphic computing principles discussed in section 2.6.
The NLB is a single layer component capable of learning any basic logic function: AND,
NOT, OR, XOR, XNOR, NAND, NOR, and any n input functions. What is important to
note, XOR/XNOR are examples of operations that are not linearly separable. An example
of this linear separable concept is shown in Fig. 3.8 with a 2-input AND gate compared
to a 2-input XOR gate. The AND gate has one decision boundary, when both inputs are
high. The XOR gate was two decision boundaries: when both inputs are high and when
both inputs are low. The AND gate could be represented using a single layer neuron that
learns the function of the hyperplane; however, the XOR gate would need two neurons that
learned the described hyperplanes and a second level that combined them to a single result.
Since the NLB does not use simple monotonic activation functions, it can implement any
n input function as long as the activation function has n + 1 boundaries. This component










Figure 3.8: Seperability of AND and XOR logic functions. The green circle with an X represents
when the output is desired to be a one while the red circle represents when the output should be
zero.
used in FPGAs.
The non-monotonic activation function is shown in Fig. 3.9 with the left plots represent-
ing training without a bias signal and the right plots with a bias signal. AND and OR gates
only have one decision boundary, where all inputs are logic ‘1’ for AND or when one input
is logic ‘1’ for OR. For the XOR function, an n-bit XOR function requires n+1 boundaries
as the output toggles based on the number of inputs that are active. The same is true for
NAND, NOR and XNOR except now it is desirable for the output to have a ‘1’ when all
inputs are ‘0’. For a generic activation, the bottom plots show how scaling the values of the
thresholds can let one activation function map to many different logic functions.
Because of the random weight initialization with training, the amount of power con-
sumed for any n-inputs will be inherently different, as there are multiple weight combi-
nations that could generate the same desired output [24]. The goal is to mask the power
dissipation by adaptive use of the MTNLB. The stochastic nature of the synapse weights
in the MTNLB network, with bipolar weights, will provide variability in the power traces;
moreover, there is a significant reduction in the power consumption with the MTNLB com-
pared to standard lookup table or CLB logic, as shown in Fig. 3.10. This is important as
smaller power fluctuations in a power trace will cause more traces to form correlations.
Lastly, it is also shown that the MTNLB, when implemented in analog-digital mixed signal
design, requires less transistor resources than an equivalent performing LUT design used
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Figure 3.9: Plot of activation functions for AND, OR, XOR, NAND, NOR and XNOR functions.
The top plots are the desired activation for each labeled gate. The bottom plots shown how the
activation functions can be realized with one standard activation function. No bias is shown on the
left and using a bias is shown on the right [24].
Figure 3.10: Energy delay product for the proposed NLB designs compared to that of a standard
LUT [24]. The MTNLB is the only implementation style that will be used in this work, but power
data is provided for the ANLB and RANLB.
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in an FPGA. This means that MTNLBs could be used to replace, or compliment, LUTs
in an FPGA to provide SCA mitigation to any implemented cryptographic algorithm. The
characteristics that are hoped to be exploited in the MTNLB to produce a SCA resistant
circuit are:
• Inherent device variability of the memristor (process variations)
• Ultra low power design (several orders of magnitude less)
• Stochastic power consumption based on the trained values of memristor (unique to
each NLB)





The circuits in this work are split into two groups: digital and analog. The digital section
circuits implement the full SHA-3 algorithm, while the analog circuits only implement the
θ plane due to the length of simulation. To provide accurate comparisons between the
analog circuits that have only θ implemented to the full digital implementations, all circuits
discussed in section 4.1 will have another circuit with only θ implemented. The digital θ
only circuits will not be discussed as they are a subcircuit of the presented circuits.
4.1 Digital Implementations
4.1.1 High-Speed Core - Base Circuit
For analysis of the SHA-3 algorithm, the SHA-3 high-speed core implementation provided
by the SHA-3 authors was used [6]. This HDL model was modified when adding mitiga-
tions to provide a base for comparison of mitigations to no mitigation. Fig. 4.1 shows the
block level diagram of the high-speed core. Starting from the left, the input into a round
is either the previous state, in the case of squeezing, or the previous state XOR’d with a
new block of input, in the case of absorbing. The block diagram shows a 5x5x5 cube for
simplicity, but the actual state in all circuits will by 5x5x64. From here, the columns of the
1600-bit state are XOR’d to generate a 5x64 plane that is called the θ plane. To generate
the resulting θ output, the bit at (x, y, z) is XOR’d with two-bits in the θ plane as discussed
in section 2.5.2 to obtain θout(x, y, z). The next phases of ρ and π are remappings. The χ
operation takes each input bit and applies a non-linear function comprised of 3 logic gates,
AND, XOR, and NOT per bit. The final operation is a 64-bit XOR on the first lane of the







Round Counter == 0
SHA-3 Core
Figure 4.1: Block diagram of the basic SHA-3 high-speed core implementation. The state is repre-
sented as a 5x5x5 cube where as the actual implementation is 5x5x64. The blue colored gates and
state bits show an example of creating one θ(x, z) plane bit and also the ι step. The red gates and
state bit show an example of how one θout(x, y, z) bit is created.
4.1.2 Mitigation One - Dual Core Design
The first circuit for SCA mitigation testing was to use two simultaneously instantiated
SHA-3 high-speed cores. The first core would perform the SHA-3 hash algorithm while
the second core would compute the SHA-3 hash with inverted input data. This design is
inspired from the dual-rail logic family where every ‘0’ to ‘1’ bit transition has a com-
plementary ‘1’ to ‘0’ transition. Since the θ plane creation uses a linear function, XOR,
dual-rail logic can be implemented by using the inverse input data. This is not full dual-rail
logic as this does not hold for the χ permutation. Since the attack is happening on the
θ plane, the methodology is valid. Fig. 4.2 shows the block diagram for this mitigation
circuit. Two SHA-3 cores are instantiated and one is fed the normal input data while the
second receives the inverse data by using 1600 NOT gates, one for each bit.
4.1.3 Mitigation Two - θ Plane Masking
For a more compact digital implementation, mitigation two uses the inverse operation on













Round Counter == 0
SHA-3 Core
Figure 4.2: Block diagram of the SHA-3 dual-core mitigation. The state is represented as a 5x5x5
cube where as the actual implementation is 5x5x64. The blue colored gates and state bits show an
example of creating one θ(x, z) plane bit and also the ι step. The red gates and state bit show an
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SHA-3 Core
Figure 4.3: Block diagram of the SHA-3 XNOR θ plane mitigation. The state is represented as a
5x5x5 cube where as the actual implementation is 5x5x64. The blue colored gates and state bits
show an example of creating one θ(x, z) plane bit and also the ι step. The red gates and state bit
show an example of how one θout(x, y, z) bit is created.
set of XNOR gates to calculate the inverse θ plane. This saves on 1600 ∗ 3 gates that are
used in the χ permutation and the one 64-bit gate used during ι. Fig. 4.3 shows the block
diagram of this circuit.
4.1.4 Mitigation Three - NLB θ Plane Masking
The third mitigation uses the concepts of NLBs discussed in section 3.3. The implemen-
tation of MTNLBs presented in previous work has been an analog implementation. This
work will implement both an analog and digital MTNLB circuit to compare mitigation in
different design domains. Power analysis success results from characteristic power con-
sumption seen in CMOS circuits; thus, implementing the MTNLB in digital logic can
show the possibility of decorrelating power consumption from input data while still using
full digital CMOS logic.
Fig. 4.4 shows the high level block diagram of this mitigation. The 5-bit XOR gates in
the θ plane creation step are replaced with 5-bit MTNLBs. Fig. 4.5 shows the RTL level



















Figure 4.4: Block diagram of the SHA-3 NLB θ plane mitigation. The state is represented as a
5x5x5 cube where as the actual implementation is 5x5x64. The blue colored gates and state bits
show an example of creating one θ(x, z) plane bit and also the ι step. The red gates and state bit
show an example of how one θout(x, y, z) bit is created.
input and the MTNLB. These weights are trained outside of this RTL model using Matlab.
This was done as the power consumption of the training phase is not as important as the
power consumed during the cryptographic hash computation. The weights are represented
using fixed point notation (Qm, Qn) where Qm is the number of integer bits and Qn is the
number of fractional bits. The (Qm, Qn) used in this implementation is (3, 4) for a total of
8-bits.
Normally the synaptic response between the input and the neuron is found by multi-
plying the synaptic weight with the corresponding input. This works well in software, but
in hardware this would require a (Qm, Qn) x (Qm, Qn) multiplier for every input. In this
design, there is a need for 320 5-bit MTNLBs resulting in 320 ∗ 5 multiplier units. To
simplify this, an 8-bit, 2-1 MUX is used for every synaptic input and uses the XOR input,
either ‘0’ or ‘1’, as its select line. If the input is low, it will pass on the value of ‘0’, while if
the input is high, it will pass on the value of the synaptic weight. The outputs of these 8-bit,
2-1 MUXs will be summed using an adder tree of (Qm, Qn) bit adders. For the neuron ac-
tivation function, the non-linear function described in section 3.3 will be used. This will be

































Figure 4.5: RTL Diagram of MTNLB. The left shows how synaptic summation is implemented
while the right shows how the MTNLB activation function is implemented.
synaptic sum falls into. In this case, there are 256 possible values as the fixed-point number
is 8-bit. The 256 values are split into 6 sections fulfilling the n + 1 decision boundaries
requirement to ensure a possible solution. The final output of the MTNLB will be either
‘0’ or ‘1’ dependent on an even boundary being active (active low in this implementation).
This is equivalent to the activation function outlined in the MTNLB description.
4.2 Analog Implementations
Digital circuits are ineffective at implementing some of the basic features found in neuro-
morphic design, such as addition, weight storage and synaptic response calculations. The
analog implementations were only implemented for the θ permutation due to simulation
time. These circuit will be compared to the corresponding digital θ only circuit for fair
comparisons.
4.2.1 Mitigation Four - NLB θ Plane Masking - default
The MTNLB can be broken down into three main components, the global trainer, the range-
select/local trainer and the activation function as shown in Fig. 4.6.
Fig. 4.7a shows the range-select component. It takes a voltage input and performs the



















Figure 4.6: Block level diagram of the analog MTNLB. For one MTNLB there is a single global



















































Figure 4.7: (a) shows the range select component. It consists of n local trainers (red), n memristors,
n comparators (green) and log2(n) NAND gates(blue). (b) shows the local trainer circuit. ’Z’ is
high impedance. (c) shows the activation circuit. (d) shows the global trainer.
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The currents are summed by a shared node instead of the need for adders as in the digital
implementation. This summed current is sent to n comparators where the number of com-
parators is equal to the number of inputs of the MTNLB. The comparators find the range,
m, that the summed current falls into by having one of the active-low select lines be active.
By design, only one Selm signal is active at a time.
Inside the range-select block are n local trainers whose responsibility is adjusting in-
dividual synapse weights, memristors, based on control signals from the global trainer.
Fig. 4.7b shows the circuit diagram for the local trainer. The signals ClkSel, m+ and m−
come from the global trainer. When ClkSel is high, the values of m+ and m− are valid
for training. If the input, Xi, is low, the value of ‘0’ is passed through the MUX and the
weight of the memristor is unchanged. If the value of Xi is high, the values of m+ and
m− are applied to the memristor to change its internal state. m+ and m− are set by the
global trainer to correctly increment or decrement the memristor state. When ClkSel is
low, there is no training to be done, and the voltage on the input of the memristor is Xi
while the output is summed together with the rest of the memristors.
The activation function takes, as inputs, the active-low select lines from the range select
block, seli and the inputs to the MTNLB, Xi. Fig. 4.7c shows the circuit diagram for the
activation function. The activation function is a generic function where the desired function
is configured by changing the reference currents in the range-select block. To get the non-
monotonic function, the even select lines from the range-select block are used as inputs to
a NAND gate. This covers the function previously shown in Fig. 3.9 on the left side, but
not the plots on the right. To get the alternate behavior of having an active output when all
inputs are low, a D-flip-flop is used with the clock signal being the XNOR of the inputs. If
all the inputs are low, the D-flip-flop will have the value of Yexp clocked to the output. If
Yexp is ‘0’ while all inputs are low, the values of Y and Ycomp will be the normal expected
outputs. If Yexp is ‘1’ while all the inputs are low, the bias signal will be set to ‘1’. This has
the effect of training the circuit on the inverse of the desired function, and then outputting
that inverse whenever a future input propagates through the circuit. This bias signal can













Figure 4.8: Block diagram for the SHA-3 analog Dual-MTNLB implementation. One box labeled
‘NLB’ is equivilent to the circuit described in Fig. 4.6. One MTNLB pair is shown while the full
design of θ will have 320 MTNLB pairs. Red wires represent active signals while black represent
non-active signals. The MTNLB pair will always have five of its 10-bit lines active for any given
input in this configuration.
The final block is the global trainer shown in Fig. 4.7d. The global trainer generates
training signals when the MTNLB output does not match the expected output. A special
XOR is used for the Yexp and Y signals that outputs the XOR of the two signals (SEL)
and the complement of Y , (NEG). Two latches are used with a second clock to ensure
the sampled training signals stay valid for one training cycle. If NEG is high, Y is less
than Yexp which sets m+ and m− to cause a negative drop across the memristor (increased
resistance). If NEG is low, Y is greater than Yexp which sets m+ and m− to cause a pos-
itive drop across the memristor (decreased resistance). When SEL and the R̄/W signal
are high, training is desired and ClkSel goes high. If either SEL is low, correct output, or
R̄/W is low, currently reading a value, the value of ClkSel is set low to prevent modifica-
tion of memristor states1.
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4.2.2 Mitigation Five - NLB θ Plane Masking - Dual Implementation
Mitigation five follows the same concept as the digital dual-core SHA-3 implementation.
For every MTNLB trained to compute an XOR function, there will be a complementary
MTNLB that will learn the XOR function, but with inverted inputs. There will be a total
of ten memristor weights trained to the XOR function with five (as ten total inputs with
complements) inputs always active for any given input combination. This can be considered
the dual-rail logic version of the MTNLB and can be seen in Fig. 4.8 showing how five,
and only five, inputs will always be active.
4.3 Summary
To compare the analog results for effectiveness to the digital mitigations, the digital miti-
gations were re-simulated in circuits that used a one round SHA-3 permutation with only θ
instantiated. As will be seen in the results, this is valid for comparisons as the addition of
π, ρ, χ and ι portions does not significantly affect the success rates of finding a key.
1The amount of time the R̄/W signal is high affects how much the memristor weights change. This affects the training





The design flow used to test, validate, and attack the SHA-3 circuit implementations is a
modification of the design flow presented in [22]. Fig. 5.1 shows the design flow used for
power analysis in Synopsys. Python generates input data to the SHA-3 hash function that
is defined as a 320-bit key pre-pended to a 704-bit message.
The generated input is sent to Matlab to calculate a hamming weight matrix1. The
hamming weight matrix has a hamming weight calculated for every input vector and key
guess pair. The hamming weight for any input vector can be found by first finding the θ
plane as seen below:
1The hamming weight and hamming distance mean the same thing for θplane creation. The initial state is all 0, and























Figure 5.1: Block diagram of the digital design flow from RTL to sythesized power data using
Synopsys, Matlab and Python. Red blocks use Python, blue blocks use Matlab and green blocks use
Synopsys.
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θplane(x, z) = ⊕4y=0S(x, y, z)
x ∈ {0, 1, ..., 4}, z ∈ {0, 1, ..., 63}
(5.1)
Where all coordinates y = 0 are the 320 key bit guesses of the SHA-3 MAC algorithm.










, ((8 ∗ i) mod 64) + z
))
p ∈ {1, 2, ..., V }, i ∈ {1, 2, ..., 40}
(5.2)
HWp,i is the hamming weight for the input vector p, of the key byte i, and V is the
number of input vectors. For these experiments, the key guess size is one byte (256 values
over 40 bytes) and the number of power traces used is 500,000 for a 500,000 X 256 X 40
matrix2. This is only calculated one time and can be reused on any number of circuits as
long as the input data remains the same.
For the power collection phase, an RTL diagram along with a technology node file,
TSMC 130 nm and 45 nm in this case, is read into the Synopsys Design Compiler. The
compiler maps the HDL model into ASIC components and routes the design according to
provided constraints. The synthesized HDL file is fed into the VCS MX simulator with a
testbench to generate a switching file that notes events for power analysis. This file is given
to the Synopsys Prime Time power analyzer along with a file that will give any top level
port constraints. The Synopsys Prime Time tool saves power consumed for each event in
a power out file. The power out file contains an entry for every component in the design
allowing the ability to gather power consumption from any sub-entity. Also, Prime Time
will estimate the average power consumption of the circuit divided between the clocking
network, combinational logic, circuit leakage, and dynamic power.
For these experiments, only the total power of the circuit is required, so a Python file
2This formula is only valid for this one byte case, changing the number of bits under attack would affect the size of
the array and how many bits are summed together
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Figure 5.2: Flow of correlation attack in Matlab.
is used to strip all of the lower level component entries to obtain a file that is easier to
read in Matlab3. The final step is to perform correlation analysis on the power data and the
hamming weight matrix to determine the correct key guesses. Fig. 5.2 shows an example of
the attack flow. Matlab’s Corr function is used to compute the correlation of each column in
the power matrix to every column in the current byte of the hamming weight matrix. Each
column pair will produce one value in the correlation matrix that represents the correlation
of key guess x, at power collection time y, for the key byte z.
In [22], the number of power traces used for a design was under 10,000 traces. For
SHA-3, since a linear function was the attack point, 500,000 traces were needed. The hard
drive size required to collect 500,000 traces would result in over 10 TB of data for the
initial SHA-3 implementation, with no mitigations, running the same scripts. To reduce
this, a Python script was created that runs all the Synopsys sections of Fig. 5.1 as well as
‘Parse Output File’ and ‘Verify Result’. This script can be given an iteration number to
collect that number of power traces from Synopsys, parse them, and then append them to


















Figure 5.3: Block diagram of the analog design flow from RTL to sythesized power data using
Cadence, Matlab and Python. Red blocks use Python, blue blocks use Matlab and green blocks use
Cadence
the previously computed traces allowing the ability to run a given simulation on multiple
cores (10 in this case, of 50,000 traces each) while only generating 10 GB of data total.
5.2 Analog Simulations
The MTNLB components were developed in Verilog-AMS and simulated in Cadence using
NCSIM. Fig. 5.3 shows the block level diagram for the Cadence design flow. Since analog
simulation take a long time, a single MTNLB was simulated 320 times to generate power
profiles for 320 unique MTNLB instantiations. The power profile was created by allowing
the MTNLB to train for 40 training cycles and then collecting the power consumed for
one clock cycle of each possible input. A training cycle consists of seeing every possible
input and the expected output to train on. Every MTNLB was verified to output the correct
values, the XOR function, for all possible input combination before power results for that
MTNLB were used. Using Matlab, the same algorithm that generated the hamming weight
information was modified to index into one of the 320 MTNLBs and get the power that
would be expected to be consumed for that SHA-3 state’s set of inputs. This was repeated
for the remaining 319 MTNLBs in the design to generate the total power for one power
trace. The process was repeated for the remaining 499,999 traces to obtain 500,000 traces
that represented the θ function. Once the power traces were created, the attack used the
same code to generate the correlation coefficient matrix and output plots. The mtnlbCon-
trol.py file also randomizes the initial states of the memristor before every simulation.
The digital components were simulated in Synopsys with a 130 nm and 45 nm node
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size, while the analog simulation used a 45 and 16 nm node size. This was done to show
a wide range of device technologies for SCA. Power consumption comparisons will only
be taken at the 45 nm node size to provide fair comparisons. This work will also show
the 130 nm simulation closely matches the results another group obtained with a physical
evaluation board that contained both 45 nm and 22 nm FPGA fabrics [12]. This provides
evidence in the practical application of the results from the different circuit simulations.
5.3 Script API
This section will break down each script with an explanation on how to use it and its
intention.
5.3.1 generate.py
generate.py calls KeccakInputGen(...), to generate random input vectors based on a given
key. The header for this function is:
1 def KeccakInputGen(self, iterations, numFiles,k,
2 r=1024,c=576,n=1024,verbose=False):
3 """Compute the Keccak[r,c,d] sponge function on message M
4
5 iterations: the number of input vectors inside a file
6 numFiles: the number of files of size ’iterations’ to make
7 r: bitrate in bits (default: 1024)
8 c: capacity in bits (default: 576)
9 n: length of output in bits (default: 1024)
10 key: key to use in this (must be 320 bits)
11 verbose: print the details of computations(default:False)
12 """
This script formats data as expected by the runSimulation.py script and was used in this
work to generate 10 files containing 50,000 test vectors each.
5.3.2 runSimulation.py
runSimulation.py controls running the Synopsys tools in a way that is resource management
friendly. The header for this script is:
1 def runSimulation(circuitName, synopsysIterations,
2 totalIterations,inputDataName):
3 """Run the Synopsys power design flow
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4 circuitName : name of the circuit folder (working folder)
5 synopsysIterations : iterations to run at one time
6 totalIterations : total iterations in the input data
7 inputDataName : the input data file being read
8 """
This script will create an input file the correct size as denoted by synopsysIterations
for as many runs until totalIterations is reached. If simulation fails for any reason, the
script can be rerun and progress will continue from the most recent failure point. If reused
for another algorithm, the only change that would need to be made is altering how the
algorithm generates the input file to the testbench to match how the target algorithm’s test
bench expects input. runSimulation.py also uses helper functions to format the Synopsys
power file to something that is easier to read in Matlab.
5.3.3 mtnlbControl.py
mtnlbControl.py handles the analog power profiling step in Cadence by using the run-
MTNLBSimulation(...) function:
1 def runMTNLBSimulation(inputSelectFile, MTNLBoutput,
2 finalOut,numberNLBs):
3 """simulates NLB component
4 inputSelectFile : file containing initial memristor states
5 MTNLBoutput : file for Cadence to dump power output
6 finalOut : file to stop all power outputs
7 numberNLBs : # NLB’s to simulate
8 """
This function will profile as many NLBs as set by numberNLBs while verifying that
the output matches the expected output. The results are 30 time samples long, with a 5 ns
step size, per line. Each line is the output of the MTNLB for one input combination (0-31).
All the results are appended together in an output file that is used by Matlab to create the
analog power traces.
5.3.4 initialize.m, createPowerTrace.m, attack cpa.m, thesisPlots.m
These Matlab scripts all facilitate the CPA attack. initialize.m will create a hamming weight
matrix, if one does not exist, for the current generated input data. If a new cryptographic









































Figure 5.4: Folder structure used in this work for both simulation and attack.
model of that algorithm. attack cpa.m performs a CPA attack using Matlab’s built in cor-
relation function, Corr(. . . ). This script is generic to any algorithm as long as the user
implements a way to create the hamming weight matrix for their algorithm. The thesis-
Plots.m script generates all the figures seen in the results chapter. It works on the result of
the correlation matrix; thus, is generic to any algorithm.
The createPowerTrace.m script is specific to the MTNLB power profiling results gen-
erated from the mtnlbControl.py script. It takes the input to the XORs in the θ plane and
identifies the power consumption for the corresponding MTNLB. These results are summed
for all 320 MTNLBs in the θ plane giving the MTNLB power trace for θ.
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5.3.5 Folder Structure
The folder structure used can be seen in Fig. 5.4. Inside the root folder is the folder con-
taining all the inputs for the designed circuits, a folder for each circuit implementation, and
all the helper scripts that are common to all implementations. Inside of a circuit folder is a
Matlab and Synopsys folder. The matlab folder holds the formatted output from Synopsys
before it is read in by Matlab using the attack cpa.m script. Inside the Synopsys folder is
the folder structure used for Synopsys power simulations. compile.log, simulation.log and
command.log store the output for circuit synthesis, circuit simulation, and entered com-
mands respectively. compile.log will contain the routing information along with the final
size of the design layout. simulation.log will record any output from the testbench during
circuit simulation as well as the final average power data for the circuit. The rtl folder holds
all of the HDL files for the current implementation. The lib folder contains technology node
files that indicate to Synopsys the technology node to use for synthesis. Also in this folder is
a .sdc file that can be used to give signal constraints to any signal that is part of the top level
hierarchy, i.e. inputs and outputs. The tb folder contains the current circuit’s testbenches.
The scr folder contains the scripts used by the Makefile to automate the full Synopsys suite
of tools. There is one script for compiling, dc commands circuit.tcl, one for simulation,
simv commands circuit.tcl, and one for power collection, pt commands circuit.tcl. Finally,
the test vector folder contains the current set of inputs to give to the design for power col-





The first section in this chapter will show analysis of power traces and the attack method-
ology as it applies to the initial SHA-3 circuit with no modifications. Metrics to rate per-
formance and benchmarks to evaluate the success of an attack will also be discussed as
they apply to the initial SHA-3 circuit. The following sections will show results for each
hardware mitigation following the metrics and benchmarks introduced in the first section.
6.1 Initial SHA-3 Attack
Before an attack can be carried out, and mitigations applied, there needs to be an under-
standing on the power profile of the circuit under investigation. Fig. 6.1 shows a single
SHA-3 power trace for both 130 nm and 45 nm technology nodes. From the single trace,
all rounds can be identified by noting the spikes of the waveform. This is useful when
many power traces are needed for an attack, as a small window can be used to perform
SPA/DPA/CPA. The first round happens at the largest spike of power for the 130 nm case,
while the first round for the 45 nm case happens at the first spike higher than the power
consumption of the falling edge of the clock, both 320 ns. This knowledge can reduce an
attack to a few target cycles; however, this work will perform CPA on all clock cycles to
analyze behavior over the entire SHA-3 algorithm. Also of note, θ, ρ, π, χ and ι can not be
deciphered from a single SHA-3 power trace. The 45 nm implementation consumes less
power (9 mW compared to 48 mW spikes), but has more prominent static power leakages.
This can be seen during the data loading phase of Fig. 6.1b where the dynamic consumption
is not above the static leakage.
Fig. 6.2 shows 50 power traces for both the 130 nm and 45 nm technology nodes of
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SHA-3 Power Trace - 130 nm
(a) 130 nm
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SHA-3 Power Trace - 45 nm
(b) 45 nm
Figure 6.1: A single SHA-3 power trace with the 130 nm implementation on the left and the 45
nm implementation on the right. The red section is the data loading section that moves 64-bits of
input into the state per clock cycle. The green section is the 24 cycle SHA-3 algorithm. The purple
section is when the finish flag is set to denote a SHA-3 computation has completed. The orange
section is the data output generation, 64-bits per cycle. The last cycle is the reset cycle bringing the
state back to initial conditions.
(a) 130 nm (b) 45 nm
Figure 6.2: 50 traces for the SHA-3 initial circuit with the 130 nm implementation on the left and
the 45 nm implementation on the right. The lighter blue sections show both the data loading and
data receiving sections. The yellow section of the left plot shows the initial round while all rounds
are yellow on the right plot. In both cases, the variance in peak power differs by approximately 1
mW.
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the SHA-3 initial implementation. The power traces can be seen to be consistent between
each other with less than 1 mW of variance. This variance is the attack point for CPA,
correlating to the input data.
Fig. 6.3 shows the correlation of 6 different key guesses. The top plot of each subplot
is the correlations with an attack of 5,000 power traces. The bottom plot of each subplot is
the correlations with an attack of 500,000 power traces. The plots show the importance of
using enough power traces for an attack. With few traces, correct correlations are close to
the same level as the incorrect correlations. The key guesses are specifically picked to show
characteristics in linear function CPA. The first key guess is 0, the correct guess. The next
key guess is 255, the 8-bit inverse of 0. The other key guesses are in pairs with their inverse,
the values are: (8, 247) (1 and 7 hamming distance away) and (33, 222) (2 and 6 hamming
distance away). It can be seen, in Fig. 6.3a, that the key guess of 0 is shown with the highest
correlation. The correct key guess of round 1 is the lowest correlated value in round 2. The
inverted guess of 255 follows the opposite behavior of the non-inverted correct guess; this
makes sense when referring to the previous discussion in section 3.1.1. The key guess of 0
has no active bits, or a hamming weight of 0. The key guess of 255 has every bit active, or
a hamming weight of 8. Since the hamming distance of these two guesses are the farthest
apart, their power consumption should be the farthest apart if the hamming weight power
model is valid. For the key guess that is 1 hamming distance away, 8, from the correct
guess, 0, the correlation value is slightly lower than the correct correlation value. This
follows for guesses that are 2 and 3 hamming distance away from the correct guess with
decreasing correlation peaks. A hamming distance of 4 will result in the lowest peak while
5, 6 and 7 all follow the inverse behavior of 1, 2 and 3.
The mentioned behavior follows for both 6.3c and 6.3d; however, Fig. 6.3b does not
follow this trend. No clear peaks are distinguishable even after 500,000 traces and correla-
tion values are a magnitude lower than the others. The argument for CPA was every active
bit consumes some characteristic power (hamming weights or hamming distance), either
increasing or decreasing, depending on the number of active bits at a given point in time.
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(d) 45 nm (only θ)
Figure 6.3: Correlation coefficients for 6 key guesses on key byte 1 of the SHA-3 initial implemen-
tation. The correct key is 0 with inverse 255. Key guess 8 is a hamming distance of 1 from the
correct guess with 247 as its inverse. Key guess 33 is a hamming distance of 2 from the correct
guess with 222 as its inverse.
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(d) 45 nm (only θ)
Figure 6.4: The correlation matrix for the SHA-3 initial implementation over two technology nodes
for full and θ configurations. θ configurations are similar to each other while the full implementa-
tions are not.
Since the guess pairs presented in the figure are the inverses of each other, their correla-
tion coefficients are also the inverse of each other. This observation is meaningless when
looking at non-linear functions such as the SHA-3 χ function or the AES S-box; yet, this
property will be exploited in mitigation techniques applied to linear functions such as θ.
Fig. 6.4 shows the correlation matrix of key byte one over all 256 possible key guesses
for both 130 nm and 45 nm technology nodes. The correlation matrix is a three dimen-
sional matrix that has time samples on the x-axis, key guesses on the y-axis and correlation
coefficients on the z-axis. The probable correct key guess is the one that has the maximum
peak of the correlation matrix (or 3D plot). The magnitude of peaks compared to others
gives some information about how confident the max correlation value represents the cor-
rect key guess. In practice, this plot is not useful to perform an attack, but it can be useful
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to see how different mitigations are effecting the power profile over the entire SHA-3 al-
gorithm. Fig. 6.4b is the only plot that differs among the subplots with behavior that gives
no clear peaks while the other subplots clearly show the current guess of ‘0’. Since there
are many mitigations presented in this work, a set of metrics will be defined to be used in
performance comparisons.
6.1.1 Performance Metrics
Comparing the highest correlation value to the next highest correlation value creates a





The smallest value for the confidence ratio is 1, which would only happen if the correla-
tion coefficient of the top two key guesses were identical. The higher the confidence ratio,
the higher the spread between the found key guess and the next highest guess; thus, a high
confidence value would mean a high probability that the key guess chosen is the actual key.
Masking this information would show that the mitigation technique gives less confidence
that the attack worked, or give false confidence that it did work. Fig 6.5 shows the confi-
dence ratios for all 40 bytes of the initial SHA-3 implementation for three different sets of
power traces. Confidence ratios should increase with the addition of more power traces as
seen from 5,000 to 250,000 traces. From 250,000 to 500,000 traces there is little change,
indicating that the correlation coefficients are becoming stable. Fig. 6.5b breaks from this
pattern with a mostly level confidence ratios showing no large changes with more power
traces. This is expected given the trend from Fig. 6.4b with no clear correlation peaks.
Fig. 6.6 shows the confidence ratios in another way with indications if a key byte is
being guessed correctly. Higher bars represent higher confidence values while green bars
represent correct indicated guesses with red bars representing incorrect guesses. It is in-
teresting to note, confidence ratios on linear functions are much lower than compared to
non-linear functions like S-boxes, the main reason why attacks on linear functions require
many more traces. The 45 nm full implementation has low confidence values with most
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(a) 130 nm (b) 45 nm
(c) 130 nm (only θ) (d) 45 nm (only θ)
Figure 6.5: Confidence ratios for all key bytes at three different numbers of power traces used for
the SHA-3 high-speed core implementation.
58
Table 6.1: Resource utilization for SHA-3 initial implementation. Numbers in parenthesis are the
number of transistors for that gate while the total numbers are for that subsection of SHA-3.
SHA-3 Section Transistor Equation Total
State XOR 1024 ∗ (8) 8192
θ 320 ∗ (10 + 2 ∗ 8) + 1600 ∗ (10) 24320
ρ 0 0
π 0 0
χ 1600 ∗ (6) + 1600 ∗ (2) + 1600 ∗ (8) 25600
ι 64 ∗ (8) 512
State Flip-Flops 1600 ∗ (12) 19200
Total 8192 + 24320 + 25600 + 19200 77312
key guesses staying incorrect while the other implementations all approach 100% correctly
guessed key bytes, a trend that follows previous plots. The 130 nm θ only configuration
provides the highest confidence ratios among the 4 subplots. Even through the 45 nm im-
plementation had low confidence and low correct guesses, the 45 nm θ only implementation
had high confidence and 100% success rate.
For circuit design, there are a few common metrics that apply to any implementation
that can be used as comparison tools. Average power consumption and transistor count will
be explored for each mitigation type. While security is the ultimate goal, a system that can
provide good security while performing well in area and power consumption can be useful
in embedded application domains.
Only transistors used in the actual SHA-3 circuit will be considered and not any that
are used to interface data with the core. The Synopsys library contains cells for: XOR2,
8 transistors, XOR3, 10 transistors, AND2, 6 transistors, NOT, 2 transistors, and a 1-bit
full-adder, 10 transistors. Table 6.1 shows the calculated transistor count for the initial
SHA-3 circuit. Table 6.2 shows the approximate power consumption as measured from
Synopsys for both 130 nm and 45nm technology nodes as well as θ only results. The 45
nm implementation consumed approximately 3 times less power for the full case and 2




(c) 130 nm (only θ)
(d) 45 nm (only θ)
Figure 6.6: Confidence ratios of all 40 key bytes of the SHA-3 high-speed core. Key guesses that
are correct are indicated in green while those that are not are red. Average confidence for all 40
bytes in each trial is included in the plot titles.
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Table 6.2: Power consumption for high-speed SHA3 implementation (full and θ only) as reported
by Synopsys Prime Time analyzer. θ only implementations did not use clocked components.
Power Group 130nm (mW) 45nm (mW) 130nm θ (mW) 45nm θ (mW)
clock network 8.655 (48.42%) 3.094 (51.67%) 0.00 0.00
register 3.422 (19.14%) 1.085 (18.12%) 0.00 0.00
combinational 5.797 (32.43%) 1.809 (30.22%) 0.517 (100%) 0.237 (100%)
total 17.874 5.988 0.517 0.237
6.1.2 Benchmarks
The final comparison will be seeing how well each system performs while mitigating CPA.
Fig. 6.7 gives an example of how benchmarks will be presented as it applies to the SHA-3
initial implementation. The success rate of guessing each key is plotted with 4 curves. Each
curve represents what group the correct guess is in: top 1, top 2, top 4 and top 8. The top
1 group provides the most ideal attack result as there is no further computations needed to
obtain the key. If there is 100% success for top 2, it means that there are a possible 240 keys
that need to be checked. For top 4 and top 8 the possible keys to check are 280 and 2120
respectively.
Table 6.3: Time to brute force search a key space on the TIANHE-2 supercomputer if a key search
takes 1000 FLOPS
Key Size Time to crack
40 bits 32.47 mS
80 bits 1132 years
120 bits 1.245 ∗ 1015 years
For perspective on what those numbers mean for a brute force attack, take an example
using a super computer to brute force a key space. The TIANHE-2 is currently the fastest
super computer and can do calculations at 33.86 petaflops a second. For a conservative
estimate, assume it takes 1000 FLOPS to check one SHA-3 hash. This means the number
of hashes that can be computed per second is: 33.86∗10
15
1000
= 33.86 ∗ 1012. Table 6.3 lists how
long each of the above key sizes would take to brute force search with the TIANHE-2. Top
1 and top 2 can be seen as easily broken, while top 4 and top 8 are not computationally
feasible, but still would be considered successful for a theoretical attack.
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(d) 45 nm (only θ)
Figure 6.7: Success rates for guessing the correct 40 key bytes versus the number of power traces
used for the SHA-3 initial implementation. Data points are generated in increments of 5,000 from
5,000 to 500,000. Curves indicate the top group the correct key guess is in based on CPA results.
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The θ implementations both have higher success rates than their matching full imple-
mentation for both technology nodes. The 45 nm full implementation has lower success
with only 30% accuracy after 500,000 power traces. This seems to indicate that smaller
circuits, i.e. θ only, are easier to attack than larger circuits where all computations happen
in one clock cycle; intuitively, this makes sense.
6.2 Mitigation One — Dual-Core Design
Mitigation one attempts to mask data by taking inspiration from dual-rail logic. The desire
is to have the output, and its inverse, generated for every gate in the design. This method
instantiates two SHA-3 cores and uses the regular data for one, and the inverse data for the
other. This is not true dual-rail logic as the χ function inverse can not be computed this
way, but the desire is to mask just the θ step makes this implementation valid.
Fig. 6.8 shows the plot of 6 key guesses for the first byte of the dual-core mitigation. The
behavior between the guesses is the same as what was seen in the initial implementation
with no mitigations. Again, the full 45 nm implementation provides lower correlation
values with incorrect results as the top correlation peaks. The correlation coefficient for the
correct guess is 0.015 greater than that without any mitigations when comparing the dual
core 130 nm to the no mitigation 130 nm circuit.
Fig. 6.9 shows the 3D correlation matrix plot of the dual-core mitigation circuit for key
byte one. Fig. 6.9a suggests the mitigation does nothing as the correct byte being clearly
identifiable. The θ only implementations both show better mitigation results with Fig. 6.9c
getting the wrong guess as the highest correlation peak and 6.9d having multiple similar
peaks. Fig. 6.9b looks like random noise, something seen in the initial implementation for
the full 45 nm case.
Fig. 6.10 shows the confidence ratio for all 40 key bytes and how they change with more
power traces used. Both 45 nm implementations show small increase in confidence ratios
for any additional power traces above 5,000. The 130 nm θ implementation shows mainly
high increases from 5,000 to 250,000 traces with not much change between 250,000 and
500,000. With 130 nm full, key bytes 1-9 are the only bytes in the implementation to show
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(c) 130 nm (only theta)
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(d) 45 nm (only theta)
Figure 6.8: Correlation coefficients for 6 key guesses on key byte 1 of the SHA-3 dual-core imple-
mentation. The correct key is 0 with inverse 255. Key guess 8 is a hamming distance of 1 from
the correct guess with 247 as its inverse. Key guess 33 is a hamming distance of 2 from the correct
guess with 222 as its inverse.
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300250
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(d) 45 nm (only θ)
Figure 6.9: The correlation matrix for the SHA-3 dual-core implementation over two technology
nodes for full and θ configurations.
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(a) 130 nm (b) 45 nm
(c) 130 nm (only θ) (d) 45 nm (only θ)
Figure 6.10: Confidence ratios for all key bytes at three different numbers of power traces used for
the SHA-3 dual-core implementation.
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big confidence increases with increasing power traces. Analyzing the hamming weights in
this section, the keys have values between 0 to 3, which is on the lower side of possible
hamming weights (0-8); however, keys 0x09, 0x10, 0x11 all have a hamming weight of 2,
and do not show signs of higher confidence.
Fig. 6.11 shows all 40 key bytes with their confidence ratios and if the current byte is
indicated in the top 1 group for success. The key bytes with highest confidence shown
in the previous plot are all guessed correctly and also have the highest confidence ratio.
Having the correct guesses be those with the highest confidence ratio can be bad, as the
attacker could use a simple threshold function to determine 8 key bytes correctly, reducing
the brute force attack to 28∗(40−8) = 2256. This can not be completed with a brute force
attack, but it does constitute a theoretical break of the algorithm.
Some analysis can be done to understand why this portion of the key is weaker for the
130 nm full implementation. In the SHA-3 state, the bottom plane holds a key, the second
and third planes hold message bits, the fourth plane holds one lane of message bits while
the others are zero, and the fifth plane is all zeros. The increased confidence could come
from the additional lane of message data that the attacker can use to figure out the key
bytes. The first 8 key bytes all fall under this extra lane, making the attack target 3 lanes
of message data and one of secret key information. Every other key byte has 2 lanes of
message data, giving less known bits to unknown bits. The trend did not follow for the 130
nm θ only circuit which does bring into question if this truly is the case; however, the only
correct guesses in both 45 nm implementations was in these key bytes, 1-9.
Fig. 6.12 shows the benchmark results for the dual-core design. Other than the 8 key
bytes that were shown to be guessed correctly, no other key bytes are identified, and the
addition of more power traces seems to add nothing more to the attack. This is a good
result as it means that increasing the amount of power traces does not bring reduction in
security through SCAs. This does not follow for the 45 nm full implementation that shows
continual increasing success rates. At 500,000 traces, the mitigation still works, but it is




(c) 130 nm (only θ)
(d) 45 nm (only θ)
Figure 6.11: Confidence ratios of all 40 key bytes of the SHA-3 dual-core implementation. Key
guesses that are correct are indicated in green while those that are not are red. Average confidence
for all 40 bytes in each trial is included in the plot titles.
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(d) 45 nm (only θ)
Figure 6.12: Success rates for guessing the correct 40 key bytes versus the number of power traces
used for the SHA-3 dual-core implementation. Data points are generated in increments of 5,000
from 5,000 to 500,000. Curves indicate the top group the correct key guess is in based on CPA
results.
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Table 6.4: Resource utilization for the SHA-3 dual-core implementation. Numbers in parenthesis
are the number of transistors for that gate while the total numbers are for that subsection of SHA-3.
SHA-3 Section Transistor Equation Total
State XOR 2 ∗ (1024 ∗ (8)) 16384
θ 2 ∗ (320 ∗ (10 + 2 ∗ 8) + 1600 ∗ (10)) 48640
ρ 0 0
π 0 0
χ 2 ∗ (1600 ∗ (6) + 1600 ∗ (2) + 1600 ∗ (8)) 51200
ι 2 ∗ (64 ∗ (8)) 1024
State Flip-Flops 2 ∗ (1600 ∗ (12)) 38400
Total 16384 + 48640 + 51200 + 38400 154624
Table 6.5: Power consumption for the SHA-3 dual-core implementation (full and θ only) as reported
by Synopsys Prime Time analyzer. θ only implementations did not use clocked components.
Power Group 130 (mW) 45 (mW) 130 θ (mW) 45 θ (mW)
clock network 8.655 (37.35%) 3.094 (42.92%) 0.00 0.00
register 4.283 (18.48%) 1.085 (15.05%) 0.00 0.00
combinational 10.20 (44.17%) 3.030 (42.04%) 4.635 (100%) 1.989 (100%)
total 23.138 7.209 4.635 1.989
Table 6.4 shows the calculated transistor count for the dual-core SHA-3 implementa-
tion. Table 6.5 shows the approximate power consumption as measured from Synopsys.
The dual-core implementation uses ≈ 30% more power while increasing transistor counts
by a factor of 2 for the 130 nm case compared to the initial implementation. The 45 nm
full implementation consumes less than 3 times the power, a better result than the initial
WDDL logic implementation introduced in this work that saw area increases on the order
of 4 (due to transistor re-sizing) and area increases on the order of 2. No re-sizing was con-
sidered here as the data is clocked, and thus valid, at a pre-defined time in the circuit. This
prevents the concern about early evaluation while still being able to use standard CMOS
blocks. Power consumption was more than 3 times higher when comparing 130 nm and 45
nm full circuit configurations.
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6.3 Mitigation Two — XNOR θ plane masking
The next mitigation strategy attempts to get the benefits of the dual-core mitigation design,
but with less resources. Instead of using two streams of data as in the dual-core case, this
method uses an array of XNOR gates to compute the θ inverse while the θ plane, XOR
gates, is created.
Fig. 6.13 shows the plot of 6 key guesses for the first key byte of the XNOR mitiga-
tion. The behavior follows the previously mentioned behavior for key byte guesses for all
subplots with one exception, the second round. The second round provides correlation that
is equal to the first round for a key guess, with the sign being the same (previous results
shown a change of sign in the second round). From the no mitigation implementation,
the XNOR mitigation decreased the correlation coefficient by 0.025 for 130 nm. The top
correlation coefficient for the 45 nm full case was double the 130 nm case. For the θ imple-
mentations, more power traces can be seen to increase correlation coefficient of incorrect
guesses toward the correlation coefficient of the correct guess. The overall correlation co-
efficient of the θ implementations can be seen to be significantly higher than the full circuit
implementations.
Fig. 6.14 shows the 3D correlation plot for the XNOR mitigation giving a better idea
of what was seen from the previous plot. When compared to the other mitigations, the
lower correlation coefficients bring the correct peaks closer to the noise threshold, for 130
nm; yet, peaks at guess 0, the correct value for this key byte, can still be identified. This
behavior is less prevalent when looking at the 45 nm full implementation that still has peaks
much higher than the surrounding noise. The 130 nm θ only configuration provided peaks
that were an order of magnitude higher than the full 130 nm configuration while the 45 nm
θ only configuration was twice that of the 45 nm full implementation. This plot shows a
behavior that was not seen in the initial and dual-core mitigations with the lower technology
node being easier to attack.
Fig. 6.15 shows the confidence ratios for all key bytes with increasing number of used
power traces. For most key bytes, the increased number of power traces does lead to higher
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(d) 45 nm (only θ))
Figure 6.13: Correlation coefficients for 6 key guesses on key byte 1 of the SHA-3 XNOR imple-
mentation. The correct key is 0 with inverse 255. Key guess 8 is a hamming distance of 1 from
the correct guess with 247 as its inverse. Key guess 33 is a hamming distance of 2 from the correct
guess with 222 as its inverse.
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(d) 45 nm (only θ))
Figure 6.14: The correlation matrix for the SHA-3 XNOR implementation over two technology
nodes for full and θ configurations.
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(a) 130 nm (b) 45 nm
(c) 130 nm (only θ)) (d) 45 nm (only θ))
Figure 6.15: Confidence ratios for all key bytes at three different numbers of power traces used for
the SHA-3 XNOR implementation.
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confidence values. This is not the case for Fig. 6.15a which had relatively similar confi-
dence ratios even with increasing power traces. Confidence ratios were higher in the 45
nm full implementation when compared to the 130 nm full implementation. The matching
θ implementations shared this behavior except with higher total confidence ratios. After
250,000 traces, no configuration seems to benefit greatly from additional power traces.
Fig. 6.16 shows the confidence ratios with the correctly guessed correctly key bytes
indicated. The 130 nm implementation has the lowest confidence values with the least
number of correctly guessed key bytes. The 130 nm θ only implementation also has the
behavior of low number of correct guesses. The 45 nm full implementation has a wide
range of correlation values, but is able to get every key correct except for four. The 45
nm θ only implementation performs the worst with very high confidence ratios and 100%
success on guessing the correct key byte.
Fig. 6.17 shows the benchmark results for the SHA-3 XNOR mitigation. The strongest
configuration is the 130 nm circuit that has the top 8 group achieving a max success of
80%. The 130 nm θ only implementation’s top 8 group achieves a max accuracy of 90%,
compelling evidence as a bound for the full implementation. After 50,000 traces, the 130
nm θ implementation does not increase in accuracy with additional traces. This behavior
is desirable in a SCA mitigation. The 45 nm full circuit performs worse than the 130 nm
full implementation with the top 2 group getting to 100% after 400,000 traces. The 45 nm
θ implementation is the worst performing in this set of configurations with the entire key
identified in 100,000 traces. This seems to indicate that the smaller technology node can
be easier to attack, or atleast, harder to mitigate attacks on.
Table 6.6 shows the calculated transistor count for the SHA-3 XNOR implementation.
Table 6.7 shows the approximate power consumption as measured from Synopsys. Com-
pared to the initial implementation, there was a 0.6% increase in power for the 130 nm full
mitigation and a 10.8% increase in transistor count. The 45 nm implementation reduced
power consumption by a factor of 2.8 for the full implementation and a factor of 2.46 for




(c) 130 nm (only theta)
(d) 45 nm (only theta)
Figure 6.16: Confidence ratios of all 40 key bytes of the SHA-3XNOR implementation. Key guesses
that are correct are indicated in green while those that are not are red. Average confidence for all 40
bytes in each trial is included in the plot titles.
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(c) 130 nm (only θ)
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(d) 45 nm (only θ)
Figure 6.17: Success rates for guessing the correct 40 key bytes versus the number of power traces
used for the SHA-3 XNOR implementation. Data points are generated in increments of 5,000 from
5,000 to 500,000. Curves indicate the top group the correct key guess is in based on CPA results.
77
Table 6.6: Resource utilization for the SHA-3 XNOR implementation. Numbers in parenthesis are
the number of transistors for that gate while the total numbers are for that subsection of SHA-3.
SHA-3 Section Transistor Equation Total
State XOR 1024 ∗ (8) 8192
θ 2 ∗ (320 ∗ (10 + 2 ∗ 8)) + 1600 ∗ (10) 32640
ρ 0 0
π 0 0
χ 1600 ∗ (6) + 1600 ∗ (2) + 1600 ∗ (8) 25600
ι 64 ∗ (8) 512
State Flip-Flops 1600 ∗ (12) 19200
Total 8192 + 32640 + 25600 + 19200 85632
Table 6.7: Power consumption for the SHA-3 XNOR implementation (full and θ only) as reported
by Synopsys Prime Time analyzer. θ only implementations did not use clocked components.
Power Group 130 nm (mW) 45 nm (mW) 130 nm θ (mW) 45 nm θ (mW)
clock network 8.655 (48.09%) 3.094 (48.45%) 0.00 0.00
register 3.414 (18.97%) 1.085(16.99%) 0.00 0.00
combinational 5.927 (32.94%) 2.207 (34.56%) 2.491 (100%) 1.011 (100.00%)
total 17.996 6.386 2.491 1.011
6.4 Mitigation Three — MTNLB θ plane masking - digital
This mitigation looks at the implementation of a digital MTNLB. The attempt is to see
if neuromorphic computing principles can mask power consumption while staying in the
digital design domain.
Fig. 6.18 shows the plot of 6 key guesses for the first byte of the digital MTNLB mit-
igation. None of the subplots show any indication of leaking key information. Fig. 6.18a
shows very low correlation values, spikes of 4x10−3, with no clear indications that any
value is correlated to the input. This follows for the rest of the subplots with the 45 nm
plots, both full and θ only, having higher correlation than the 130 nm plots. Fig. 6.18b
looks like information is leaked at 320 ns, but this shows an incorrect key with the highest
correlation coefficient.
Fig. 6.19 shows the 3-D correlation matrix for the first key byte of the MTNLB miti-
gation. The same behavior of lower correlation values for the 130 nm configurations can
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(c) 130 nm (only θ)
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(d) 45 nm (only θ)
Figure 6.18: Correlation coefficients for 6 key guesses on key byte 1 of the SHA-3 digital MTNLB
implementation. The correct key is 0 with inverse 255. Key guess 8 is a hamming distance of 1
from the correct guess with 247 as its inverse. Key guess 33 is a hamming distance of 2 from the
correct guess with 222 as its inverse.
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(d) 45 nm (only θ)
Figure 6.19: The correlation matrix for the SHA-3 digital MTNLB implementation over two tech-
nology nodes for full and θ configurations.
be seen. Fig. 6.19c shows behavior that resembles the initial attack, with lower correla-
tion peaks; however, the correct key guess is denoted as ’08’ instead of ’00’. Fig. 6.19b
also looks similar to the initial attack results but follows the same incorrect guess as the
130 nm θ case. Fig. 6.19d shows an interesting behavior not seen in any other mitigation;
there seems to be only two values of correlation, high and low. This is excellent mitiga-
tion behavior as this should mean confidence values are near one, and there should be no
confidence if a key is correct or not. The behavior is something to explore in the future to
attempt to replicate in mitigation implementations.
Fig. 6.20 shows the confidence ratios over different amounts of power traces. For all
subplots, the behavior is generally the same with increased power traces not changing con-
fidence values. Only Fig. 6.20a goes against this trend with a few key bytes, but still not
enough to confirm any type of trend. These results match well with the 3-D correlation
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(a) 130 nm (b) 45 nm
(c) 130 nm (only θ) (d) 45 nm (only θ)
Figure 6.20: Confidence ratios for all key bytes at three different numbers of power traces used for
the SHA-3 digital MTNLB implementation.
plots that had correlations that did not leak correct key guess information.
Fig. 6.21 shows the confidence values for the MTNLB mitigation and the key bytes
guessed correctly. Confidence values stay low, with the highest coming from the 130 nm
(only θ) configuration. Both 130 nm implementations have a behavior of several correct
guesses in the 125,000 and 375,000 range, but than drop in correctness at 500,000. A
useful behavior as it puts an upper bound on the mitigation where additional traces do not
improve results. Fig. 6.21b had the most correct key guesses at 500,000 traces. For all
subplots though, average confidence values remain low, with Fig. 6.21d having the lowest
confidence.
Fig. 6.22 shows the success rates for the MTNLB mitigation. All configurations have




(c) 130 nm (only θ)
(d) 45 nm (only θ)
Figure 6.21: Confidence ratios of all 40 key bytes of the SHA-3 digital MTNLB implementation.
Key guesses that are correct are indicated in green while those that are not are red. Average confi-
dence for all 40 bytes in each trial is included in the plot titles.
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Table 6.8: Resource utilization for a single digital MTNLB.
Component Transistors Total
8-bit 2-1 Mux 48 5*48=240
8-bit weight 96 5*96= 480
8-bit adder 80 4*80= 320
8-bit comparitor 124 124*5=620
NAND gate 4 5*4=20
Total 1680
power traces used. Fig. 6.22a and Fig. 6.22b deviate most from this behavior with a high
increase in success from 5,000 to 100,000 traces and a constant level until 450,000 traces.
There is a strange drop from 460,000 to 500,000 in the 130 nm case that brings the success
rates below the configuration in Fig. 6.22c. Why that happens is most likely because of the
previously presented results showing confidence values; confidence values, and likewise
correlation values, are so low, the attack can be thought of as being lucky. The right mes-
sage bits seem to find some secret keys better, but those message bits are only identifiable
after the correct key is known. The assumption is that this same message bits with a dif-
ferent key would likely result in different behavior with the commonality being around the
460,000 to 500,000 success rate results.
To get the data for resource size, the previous transistor count from Table 6.1 can be
used with modifications to θ to be 320 ∗ (MTNLBcount) + 1600 ∗ (10). Table 6.8 shows
the break down of the number of transistors to implement different components in the
MTNLB. Table 6.9 shows the calculated transistor count for the SHA-3 digital MTNLB
implementation. Table 6.10 shows the approximate power consumption as measured from
Synopsys. Fully digital implementations of neuromorphic computing components can be
very inefficient even with optimized designs. The transistor count increased by a factor
of 7.8 while power consumption increased by a factor of 2.06. While the digital MTNLB
did not have a good result for size, this 2.06 more power consumption is inline with other
currently proposed dual-rail logic mitigation solutions.
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(c) 130 nm (only θ)
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(d) 45 nm (only θ)
Figure 6.22: Success rates for guessing the correct 40 key bytes versus the number of power traces
used for the SHA-3 digital MTNLB implementation. Data points are generated in increments of
5,000 from 5,000 to 500,000. Curves indicate the top group the correct key guess is in based on
CPA results.
Table 6.9: Resource utilization for the SHA-3 digital MTNLB implementation. Numbers in paren-
thesis are the number of transistors for that gate while the total numbers are for that subsection of
SHA-3.
SHA-3 Section Transistor Equation Total
State XOR 1024 ∗ (8) 8192
θ 320 ∗ (1680) + 1600 ∗ (8) 550400
ρ 0 0
π 0 0
χ 1600 ∗ (6) + 1600 ∗ (2) + 1600 ∗ (8) 25600
ι 64 ∗ (8) 512
State Flip-Flops 1600 ∗ (12) 19200
Total 8192 + 550400 + 25600 + 19200 603392
84
Table 6.10: Power consumption for the SHA-3 digital MTNLB implementation (full and θ only) as
reported by Synopsys Prime Time analyzer. θ only implementations did not use clocked compo-
nents.
Power Group 130 nm (mW) 45 nm(mW) 130 nm θ(mW) 45 nm θ(mW)
clock network 8.431 (22.83%) 3.094 0.00 0.00
register 3.887 (10.52%) 1.085 0.00 0.00
combinational 24.6 (66.65%) 6.941 24.5 (100%) 6.977 (100%)
total 36.9 11.1 24.5 6.977
6.5 Mitigation Four — MTNLB θ plane masking - analog
The analog simulations presented use a different simulator suite called Cadence. The differ-
ence between the Synopsys and Cadence simulators is event based versus time step based.
This will make the analog plots look different as there is power information given every
time step, 5 ns, for what power was consumed in the circuit; however, Synopsys would
output nothing if an event was not scheduled. Also, the analog simulations of the NLB
were done with a 150 ns clock period to see if any power leakage information might be
given at slower clock speeds.
Fig. 6.23 shows 6 key guesses for key byte 1 of the analog MTNLB mitigation imple-
mentation. Fig. 6.23b follows what was seen in the initial implementation during the first
≈ 10 ns (dynamic power consumption). After about ≈ 20 ns, when the power consumed is
mainly from leakage power, the correlation becomes stronger for a key guess two hamming
weights away from the correct guess than a key guess that is one hamming weight away.
For the attack, this has no effect since both correlation values are always below the correct
guess, but it could be an indicator on properties specific to leakage power loss and CPA. For
Fig. 6.23a, more power traces can be seen to drop the correct guess correlation coefficient
under a wrong guess.
Fig. 6.24 shows the 3D correlation matrix for the analog NLB. Note the difference in
shape that follows the behavior of a power trace in Fig. 6.23. The spiking behavior of
Fig. 6.24a looks similar to the spiking behavior of the initial implementation, but with re-
verse behavior (i.e. correct guess of ‘00’ is the lowest). For Fig. 6.24b, the spiking behavior



























SHA-3 implementation 45 nm (only theta)
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SHA-3 implementation 16 nm (only theta)
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Figure 6.23: Correlation coefficients for 6 key guesses on key byte 1 of the SHA-3 analog MTNLB
implementation. The correct key is 0 with inverse 255. Key guess 8 is a hamming distance of 1
from the correct guess with 247 as its inverse. Key guess 33 is a hamming distance of 2 from the
correct guess with 222 as its inverse.
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Figure 6.24: The correlation matrix for the SHA-3 analog MTNLB implementation over two tech-
nology nodes.
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(a) 45 nm (b) 16 nm
Figure 6.25: Confidence ratios for all key bytes at three different numbers of power traces used for
the SHA-3 analog MTNLB implementation.
Fig. 6.25 shows the confidence ratios for all 40 key bytes with increasing number of
power traces for the analog MTNLB. Fig. 6.25a shows almost no effect from the number
of power traces used while Fig. 6.25b shows increasing confidence with more used power
traces.
Fig. 6.26 shows the confidence ratios for all key bytes and the guesses that are cur-
rently correct for the analog NLB. Fig. 6.26a has increasing correctness with more power
traces, but maintains an almost constant average confidence value. In contrast, Fig. 6.26b
shows almost all key guesses correctly guessed from 5,000 traces and average confidence
increasing all the way to 500,000.
Fig. 6.27 shows the benchmark results for the analog MTNLB implementation. For
Fig. 6.27b, after about 25,000 traces all groups report 100% success rate except for the
top 1 group with a 99.75% accuracy between traces 95,000 to 155,000. This means that
no brute force work is needed and the key can be obtained very quickly with a minimal
amount of traces. For Fig. 6.27a, the top 8 group has the highest accuracy with only 72.5%
and what looks like converging behavior. A dual-core MTNLB solution may be one that
provides as good of mitigation as the digital dual-core with lower power and area.
The size of one MTNLB is given in [24] as 2nm + 20n + 12m + 30 + 2ceil(m/2)
where n is the number of inputs and m is the number of decision boundaries needed, n+ 1




Figure 6.26: Confidence ratios of all 40 key bytes of the SHA-3 analog MTNLB implementation.
Key guesses that are correct are indicated in green while those that are not are red. Average confi-
dence for all 40 bytes in each trial is included in the plot titles.
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Figure 6.27: Success rates for guessing the correct 40 key bytes versus the number of power traces
used for the SHA-3 analog MTNLB implementation. Data points are generated in increments of
5,000 from 5,000 to 500,000. Curves indicate the top group the correct key guess is in based on
CPA results.
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Table 6.11: Resource utilization for the SHA-3 analog MTNLB implementation. Numbers in paren-
thesis are the number of transistors for that gate while the multiplied number is that many of the
gate.
SHA-3 Section Transistor Equation Total
State XOR 1024 ∗ (8) 8192
θ 320 ∗ (268) + 1600 ∗ (10) 101760
ρ 0 0
π 0 0
χ 1600 ∗ (6) + 1600 ∗ (2) + 1600 ∗ (8) 25600
ι 64 ∗ (8) 512
State Flip-Flops 1600 ∗ (12) 19200
Total 8192 + 101760 + 25600 + 19200 154752
Table 6.12: Power consumption for the SHA-3 analog MTNLB implementation as reported by
Cadence NCSIM.
Power Group 45 nm θ (mW) 16 nm (mW) θ
total 2.36e-05 1.35e-05
the calculated transistor count for the SHA-3 analog MTNLB implementation. The total
count uses the number of transistors that was used in the digital cases, but these mixed
signal circuits were not simulated; the values are indicated for comparisons on total possible
circuit sizes. Table 6.12 shows the approximate power consumption as measured from
500,000 power traces with 30 samples each. The analog MTNLB transistor count increased
by a factor of 2 while power consumption decreased by a factor of 10,000 when compared
to the initial 45 nm θ implementation.
6.6 Mitigation Five — MTNLB θ plane masking - analog dual-core
Mitigation strategy five attempts to implement both an MTNLB and use concepts of dual-
rail logic with a complementary MTNLB.
Fig. 6.28 shows the results for 6 key guesses for key byte one of the analog dual-
MTNLB implementation. The behavior of Fig. 6.28b is very similar to the single MTLNB
except with the correlation magnitudes being less than half of the single MTNLB imple-
mentation. Having the same behavior as a mitigation that did not do well can be seen ini-
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SHA-3 implementation 16 nm (only theta)
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Figure 6.28: Correlation coefficients for 6 key guesses on key byte 1 of the SHA-3 analog dual-
MTNLB implementation. The correct key is 0 with inverse 255. Key guess 8 is a hamming distance
of 1 from the correct guess with 247 as its inverse. Key guess 33 is a hamming distance of 2 from
the correct guess with 222 as its inverse.
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Figure 6.29: The correlation matrix for the SHA-3 analog dual-MTNLB implementation over two
technology nodes for full and θ configurations.
what will look like noise. Fig. 6.28a performs similarly, but with a large initial correlation
peak for the inverse of the correct key guess.
Fig. 6.29 shows the 3D plot of the correlation matrix. Both plots show good behavior in
that the correct key guess does not have the highest peaks. Fig. 6.29a shows an interesting
spiking behavior that has similar high spikes and low spikes. In Fig. 6.29b The largest
peak happens around key guess 15 and has a correlation coefficient 2 times greater than
the correct guess. Also, the incorrect correlation magnitude is the same magnitude of the
correct guess in the no mitigation circuit. This shows the analog dual-MTNLB circuit
giving results with high correlation, but that are incorrect; in an attack mitigation context,
this is optimal to mask what is happening in the circuit.
Fig. 6.30 shows the confidence ratios of all key bytes with increasing number of used
power traces. There is no clear trend from the number of power traces used and the con-
fidence ratio. For some cases, more traces increase the ratio, for others, it decreases the
ratio. For a large portion, there seems to be no effect on the number of power traces and the
confidence ratio values. The not clear behavior could be good in a mitigation stand point if
the behavior of the confidence ratio does not indicate correct or incorrect guesses.
Fig. 6.31 shows the confidence ratio of all the key bytes and if the current guess is
correct for the analog dual-core analog MTNLB implementation. The average confidence
ratio is the lowest of all mitigations applied at 1.062 for 16 nm and 1.046 for 45nm after
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(a) 45 nm (b) 16 nm
Figure 6.30: Confidence ratios for all key bytes at three different numbers of power traces used for
the SHA-3 analog dual-MTNLB implementation.
(a) 45 nm
(b) 16 nm
Figure 6.31: Confidence ratios of all 40 key bytes of the SHA-3 analog dual-MTNLB implementa-
tion. Key guesses that are correct are indicated in green while those that are not are red. Average
confidence for all 40 bytes in each trial is included in the plot titles.
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Figure 6.32: Success rates for guessing the correct 40 key bytes versus the number of power traces
used for the SHA-3 analog dual-MTNLB implementation. Data points are generated in increments
of 5,000 from 5,000 to 500,000. Curves indicate the top group the correct key guess is in based on
CPA results.
500,000 traces. Note, the confidence ratio does not always improve with more guesses, but
can get worse. An automated attack would be hard to implement if the confidence ratio was
used as a threshold. There are cases where a high confidence ratio indicates both correct
and wrong guesses, and the same is true for low confidence ratios. The case with the lowest
average confidence, 45 nm, also gives the most correct key guesses.
Fig. 6.32 shows the benchmark results for the SHA-3 analog dual-MTNLB implemen-
tation. Fig. 6.32a shows accuracies that are very high after only 5,000 traces, however, they
do not seem to be effected by adding more power traces. This is similar to Fig. 6.32b
Table 6.13 shows the calculated transistor count for the SHA-3 analog dual-MTNLB
implementation. Table 6.14 shows the approximate power consumption as measured from
Synopsys. The power data was obtained from averaging power consumption data reported
by Cadence over 500,000 traces. The transistor count for this implementation was higher
than the initial implementation by a factor of 3.11 while the power dissipation was less
than the initial 45 nm θ implementation by a factor of 4300. Even with the analog circuit
being twice as large as its single MTNLB implementation, the large decrease in power
consumption could offset the 3.11 times area increase.
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Table 6.13: Resource utilization for the SHA-3 analog dual-MTNLB implementation. Numbers in
parenthesis are the number of transistors for that gate while the total numbers are for that subsection
of SHA-3.
SHA-3 Section Transistor Equation Total
State XOR 1024 ∗ (8) 8192
θ 2 ∗ (320 ∗ (268)) + 1600 ∗ (10) 187520
ρ 0 0
π 0 0
χ 1600 ∗ (6) + 1600 ∗ (2) + 1600 ∗ (8) 25600
ι 64 ∗ (8) 512
State Flip-Flops 1600 ∗ (12) 19200
Total 8192 + 187520 + 25600 + 19200 240512
Table 6.14: Power consumption for the SHA-3 analog dual-MTNLB implementation as reported by
Cadense NCSIM.
Power Group 45 θ (mW) 16 θ (mW)
Total 5.42e-05 3.10e-05
6.7 Reconfigurable Circuits
The MTNLB is a reconfigurable computing element that has the ability to learn any n
input function. Using an NLB design and comparing it to the area of an ASIC design can
be an unfair comparison. The ASIC design is not reconfigurable in nature, but the MTNLB
design could be used to implement many other functions if needed. As such, the MTNLB
is comparable to LUTs that are found in FPGAs.
For size comparisons, a minimum sized LUT is defined in [21] as:
2n ∗ Tm + 4 ∗ (2n − 1) (6.2)
n, as in the MTNLB, is defined as the number of inputs for the function. Tm is the
number of transistors to make a memory element. A 5-input LUT should have approxi-
mately 316 transistors if the number a transistors for a memory element is 6. It was shown
earlier that a 5-input MTNLB, including training circuitry, contains 268 transistors. This
makes MTNLBs 18% smaller than traditional LUTS, making the dual-MTNLB implemen-
tation shown in this work to be much less of an overhead (about 60% more area for analog
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dual-MTNLB than the initial SHA-3 circuit on FPGA).
The results will still show comparison to ASIC design as that is what the simulations
and power profiling was done for; however, it is important to note where MTNLBs be-
come more interesting as replacements to LUTs. The reconfigurable nature can give SCA
resistant properties to a wide range of algorithms.
6.8 Summary
Table 6.15 gives the summary of results from all circuits in the results section. For consid-
eration of ASIC design, the dual-core and XNOR circuits had the best performance. The
dual-core implementation doubled the area, but had correlations that were half as strong in
magnitude and was able to keep all guesses around 20% accuracy. The XNOR mitigation
provided a very small form factor while still giving sufficient security to prevent SCAs to
determine a secret key. 80% for the top 8 group is a high success rate, but without 100%
confidence in one of the groups, it is not possible to reduce the key search space. From
the behavior of the success plots, it seems that the addition of any more traces would not
dramatically increase the given percentages of the XNOR mitigation. The digital MTNLB
performed well, but the area overhead makes it something that would not be usable in
every application. The top performing circuit was the dual-MTNLB, with the lowest com-
bined power and success rate, even though average correlation was the highest. There is a
significant area overhead close to a factor of 3, however, this is lower than some area over-
heads that are seen with WDDL mitigation techniques with factors of 4. The dual-MTNLB
would shine in reconfigurable computing, where the MTNLB is a fraction of the size of a
current LUT. This would give a mitigation technique that would require 60% area overhead
to get mitigation results that make SCAs near impossible (at least in the current forms of
SPA/DPA/CPA for power analysis).
In comparison to a physical implementation, [12] had results that were similar to the
initial SHA-3 circuit simulations. Both initial circuits used the same HDL model provided
by the SHA-3 authors and both circuits saw accuracies approaching near 100%, but not
quite reaching 100% for the top 1 guess group. The similarities in physical implementation
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to the simulation gives some evidence that the mitigation simulations are realistic, and
would have similar behavior if implemented in physical hardware. Their work used 4
potential attack models for results while this work only used one, the model that provided
the highest correlation values.
Table 6.15: Collected results for all circuits discussed in this work. Average confidence and average
max correlation is added. Both metrics are taken from the results of 500,000 used power traces
Success Rates




Top1 Top2 Top4 Top8
Initial 130 nm 77312 17.874 1.202 0.0317 97.5% 100% 100% 100%
Initial 45 nm 77312 5.988 1.042 0.0542 7.5% 12.5% 27.5% 27.5%
Initial θ 130 nm 24320 0.517 1.299 0.0720 100% 100% 100% 100%
Initial θ 45 nm 24320 0.237 1.258 0.0314 100% 100% 100% 100%
Dual-Core 130 nm 154624 23.138 1.093 0.0144 20% 20% 22.5% 22.5%
Dual-Core 45 nm 154624 7.209 1.045 0.0058 15% 17.5% 25% 30%
Dual-Core θ 130 nm 48640 4.635 1.208 0.1084 17.5% 20% 20% 20%
Dual-Core θ 45 nm 48640 1.989 1.038 0.0106 5% 7.5% 20% 22.5%
XNOR 130 nm 85632 17.996 1.051 0.0138 35% 52.5% 67.5% 80%
XNOR 45 nm 85632 6.386 1.134 0.0174 90% 97.5% 97.5% 97.5%
XNOR θ 130 nm 32640 2.491 1.190 0.1096 70% 75% 77.5% 87.5%
XNOR θ 45 nm 32640 1.011 1.265 0.0404 100% 100% 100% 100%
Dig NLB 130 nm 603392 36.9 1.046 0.0055 2.5% 2.5% 7.5% 15%
Dig NLB 45 nm 603392 11.1 1.064 0.0221 42.5% 62.5% 87.5% 97.5%
Dig NLB θ 130 nm 550400 24.5 1.065 0.0455 10% 25% 37% 45%
Dig NLB θ 45 nm 550400 6.977 1.013 0.0607 7.5% 7.5% 7.5% 15%
Analog NLB 45 nm 154752 2.36e-05 1.014 0.0837 32.5% 40% 60% 70%
Analog NLB 16 nm 154752 1.35e-05 1.223 0.1076 100% 100% 100% 100%
Dual NLB 45 nm 240512 5.42e-05 1.047 0.0879 32.5% 50% 65% 82.5%
Dual NLB 16 nm 240512 3.10e-05 1.062 0.0427 5% 10% 15% 22.5%
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Chapter 7
Conclusions And Future Work
7.1 Conclusions
An offshoot of this work is the inherent difficulty observed in side channel attacks when it
is applied to linear functions. It was shown that attacks on single power traces are impracti-
cal on modern cryptography algorithms. It also gave a demonstration on how the SHA-3 θ
plane creation provides strong mitigation to any form of DPA. The strength of linear func-
tions for not leaking large amounts of information on input data is clearly demonstrated
when 100% accuracy is not achieved even with 500,000 power traces on the base SHA-
3 circuit. SHA-3 is a hash algorithm that can only be effectively attacked from input to
output, not output to input as in symmetric encryption algorithms. Non-linear functions,
such as S-boxes, have long been seen as prime attack points in SCA. These attacks can be
done with very few power traces, a couple thousand in the case of AES, in a very short
amount of time. SHA-3 also has this weakness, which could be argued if it is a weakness
or not, as all cryptography algorithms need a non-linear permutation, but it comes after a
linear function. Because of this, all attacks on SHA-3 have to target the θ plane creation in
some form to obtain the unknown bits of the input data. It suffices to say that cryptography
systems could become much more SCA resistant if they were designed with the non-linear
function in the middle of the algorithm, sandwiched between two linear functions that are
similar to the θ plane creation step of SHA-3.
Furthermore, it goes to reason that a much simpler and smaller linear function could
provide much more SCA resistance to the base SHA-3 algorithm. As was seen as a common
theme in the results, the key bytes located in the first lane were the easiest to guess. This
has to do with there being more known bits in the first lane to unknown bits. Mixing of less
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known bits to unknown bits could provide a better result in mitigation that can drive down
correlation coefficients and confidence ratios. With this result, it makes sense to require a
SHA-3 state to have a key that can fill two planes (640 bits) to reduce the number of known
to unknown bits from 4:1 to 3:2.
SCA with linear functions gave properties that are normally not discussed in the re-
search community. This is an extremely useful approach to designing mitigations. The idea
that the highest correlating key guess will be the same magnitude as its inverse, but with re-
verse sign, gives an important result for mitigations. If both values are processed together,
the correlations can be seen to almost cancel each other out, or atleast level out correlation
coefficients. The best mitigations were those that used dual-core systems to process both
the regular and inverse data. The XNOR mitigation used minimal additional gates and pro-
vided huge SCA resistance as it was designed to only perform the inverse function of the
linear function. Making linear functions that have both small hardware footprints, but still
mix known and unknown bits as seen in θ, can lead to mitigation techniques that follow the
same smaller footprint. The non-linear function, and any additional linear functions that are
sandwiched between the mitigation linear functions, can be much more complicated and
resource intensive to provide any needed mathematical strength. These more complicated
inner circuits do not need to be replicated for mitigation as the first and last linear function
of the round provide the full defense at hiding what is being processed in the algorithm.
This work also shows that SCA prevention techniques are better thought of during algo-
rithm creation and not in after the fact design solutions. The WDDL family of mitigations
provide promising results, but continue to add more resources and power consumption as
new vulnerabilities are found. SHA-3 was a hard to attack algorithm due to the leading
linear function that forces any attack on the algorithm to focus on it. This was a lucky
coincidence, as the authors of SHA-3 mainly discuss how effective the non-linear func-
tion can be mapped to dual-rail logic for SCA mitigations. It makes sense when thinking
of a physical attack that the physical components should be designed in such a way as to
be inherently strong; however, there still is some useful architectures that could be cre-
ated without specific knowledge of the cryptographic systems that will run on them. The
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MTNLB, part of a family of NLBs that could also be useful in SCA mitigations, compo-
nents work as reconfigurable circuits that can learn any function much like a LUT. They are
smaller than LUTs and consume much less power; yet, they are not an immediate solution
as this work showed the easiest to attack system was made out of single MTNLBs at 16
nm. The usefulness comes from their small size and variable nature, allowing for multi-
ple MTNLBs to be instantiated to provided a remarkable CPA resistant circuit. In ASIC
design, the area overhead of a factor of 3.11 still makes a competitive solution to WDDL
logic implementations, with a factor up to 4, but with far less consumed power.
7.2 Future Work
This work proved the usefulness of MTNLBs on linear functions by way of using data
and its inverse in computations to mask what was being processed in the algorithm. It
would be useful to apply the other NLBs presented in [24] and see if the properties found
in the other NLB implementations can provide better mitigations. Also, more analysis on
NLBs could be useful to figure out a way to mask power consumption within a single NLB.
The NLB can be modified to hide the power leakages that were seen in this work; making a
component that uses less power and area while providing mitigation against power analysis.
It was suggested that a two plane key, 640-bits, could prevent a successful attack on
θ. Implementing this input configuration and moving attacks to focus on χ can provide a
better full picture idea on possible full SHA-3 mitigations.
Since linear functions were exclusively looked at, looking at algorithms with easier to
attack non-linear functions, such as AES, could produce useful results on the mitigation
strength of NLBs. Because non-linear functions are easier to attack, good performance
with the NLB family on non-linear functions would provide compelling evidence to design
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